CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.414
22 May 1969
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 May 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. T. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia)

GE.69-11172
69-35404

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. V. SAFAR
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Mexico:	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
	Mr. S. DABROWA
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
	Mr. V. TARZIORU
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. U. ERICSSON
	Mr. R. BOMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. N.S. KISHILOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. C. MATHIAS
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
	Mr. W. GIVAN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. M. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the 414th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The idea of an arms control agreement for the sea-bed is basically responsive to a technological fact of life: the fact that the environment of the sea-bed is becoming increasingly accessible to man. At the same time it may be said that if we succeed in arriving at an arms control agreement for the sea-bed we shall have added one more important element to the larger picture of international restraints on armaments which has been taking form.

3. Viewed as one more step in that all-important process, a sea-bed agreement appears as the logical follow-on to the Antarctic Treaty[1/] and the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex), and indeed it would be analogous in many ways to those Treaties. It would be analogous in many ways but not in all ways, for the sea-bed is a unique environment, with its own special characteristics. Foremost among these, for our purposes, is the obvious but important fact that the sea-bed is coterminous with the sea itself, which has been used for offensive and defensive military action since almost the beginning of history. Hence the belief of the United States that, in the circumstances in which we are now living, total demilitarization of the sea-bed is scarcely practical or attainable.

4. We have studied intensively the elements which might comprise a successful arms control agreement for the sea-bed, as we have studied very carefully the views which have been put forward in this Committee. We believe that great progress has already been realized in approaching this complex subject, and that we have now reached the point where it is useful and appropriate to set forth our views in the form of a draft treaty.

5. From the statements that have been made here I believe we can all agree that there exists a desire on the part of all the members of this Committee to make progress rapidly towards preventing an arms race on the sea-bed and to arrive, if possible, at an agreement on this subject before the next session of the General Assembly. There have, however, been several suggestions as to how that goal can best be achieved. Some delegations have proposed a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. That concept is embodied in the draft treaty submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union on 18 March (ENDC/240). There have been other suggestions. Some have

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

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suggested a catalogue of the various types of installations which should be prohibited; others have suggested that specific exceptions should be written to permit certain defensive installations.

6. For its part the United States has attempted to make clear, in its statements of 25 March (ENDC/PV.397 paras. 37 et seq.) and 15 May (ENDC/PV.411, paras. 21 et seq.), its belief that the only practical way to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed would be an agreement banning the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. Such an agreement would remove the major threat to the peaceful uses of the sea-bed. At the same time it would reduce the varification problem to manageable proportions and would be consistent with the security interests of coastal States. Accordingly, on the instructions of the United States Government, we are submitting for the consideration of the Committee a draft treaty (ENDC/249) which would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. I believe that draft has now been circulated to the members of the Committee. We are of the firm conviction that by adopting this approach we shall accomplish in the simplest and speediest manner our task of preventing the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed.

7. I should like now to discuss briefly the individual articles of our draft treaty.

8. The first paragraph of article I prohibits any party from emplanting or emplacing fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, or beneath the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond a narrow band -- a band defined in article II -- adjacent to the coast of any State. The prohibition would also apply to fixed launching platforms associated with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction whether or not a missile or a warhead containing a nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction was actually in place. We believe that this is responsive to the thoughtful suggestions made by our Polish colleague (ENDC/406, paras. 11-31). The language of the prohibition goes to the heart of our greatest concern, namely, that the sea-bed might be used as an area for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction. Paragraph 2 of article I obligates each party to refrain from causing, encouraging, facilitating or in any way participating in the activities prohibited by the first paragraph of article I.

9. Article II deals with the limits of the narrow band mentioned in article I and with the question of territorial sea claims. Paragraph 1 of article II establishes the boundary of the narrow band. In deciding on the width of the band which the United States would propose, we have taken into consideration two views

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expressed by nearly all the members of this Committee who have spoken on the subject. The first is that the prohibitin should extend to the maximum practical area of the sea-bed. The second is that the limits establishing the area in which the prohibition would apply should be separated from such complex issues as territorial sea claims and national jurisdiction. This view concerning separation has been given express recognition in paragraph 3 of article II. We believe that, once that separation has been expressly recognized, setting the width of the narrow band at three miles, as is done in paragraph 1 of article II, responds to both of those views.

10. First of all, as compared with the twelve-mile width, it would add roughly 2 million square miles of sea-bed to the area of prohibition. That is an area in which, it might be pointed out, the temptation to extend the nuclear arms race might be very great, because of its proximity to the shore. Secondly, by placing the outer limit of the narrow band at three miles we have avoided the complex questions associated with the extent of national jurisdiction. Moreover, it takes care of the concern expressed by several delegations over the status of the zone that would exist between a twelve-mile limit, for example, and the outer limits of territorial waters that were less than twleve miles. Under the draft treaty we are now presenting no such zone would exist, since the three-mile limit represents, I believe, the narrowest claim for a territorial sea.

11. Paragraph 2 of article II, at present blank, would define the baselines from which the outer limit of the three-mile narrow band would be measured. We believe such definitions of baselines are necessary in view of existing claims to certain marginal seas as internal waters. In order to establish equitable boundaries and balanced obligations for all parties to the treaty, agreement will need to be worked out on how such marginal seas are to be treated. In this connexion it might be desirable and practical to draw on an existing international agreement dealing with the establishment of baselines. For its part the United States is prepared to accept baselines drawn in a manner specified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone[2/] if agreement can be reached on the appropriate interpretations of that Treaty as applied to the relevant areas in question.

2/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, pp. 205 et seq.

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12. Article III of the draft treaty being submitted today deals with verification. As is well known, the United States has consistently supported the principle of adequate verification for all arms control agreements. The question arises as to what constitutes "adequate" verification of this particular measure in the light of our present and developing capabilities. That is not an easy question to answer, particularly in view of the immense technical problems associated with operating in the hostile environment of the sea-bed. However, if we can ensure that the parties to the treaty remain free to observe the activities of other States on the sea-bed and ocean floor, we are confident that such observation will provide appropriate verification for the purposes of the treaty. One reason for this is our feeling that if a party were to violate this treaty it would not limit itself to the installation of a single weapon. If it were to violate the treaty, it would doubtless do so on a large scale.

13. Paragraph 1 of article III of our draft treaty therefore ensures the right of observation of activities on the sea-bed and ocean floor to be carried on in a way which does not interfere with the activities of States on the sea-bed or otherwise infringe rights recognized under international law, including freedom of the high seas. Paragraph 1 of article III also provides that in the event such observation does not in any particular case suffice to eliminate questions regarding fulfilment of the provisions of the treaty, the parties undertake to consult and to co-operate in endeavouring to resolve the questions.

14. I am aware that the draft treaty placed before this Conference by the Soviet representative contains the flat provision that all installations and structures on the sea-bed shall be open for verification, a provision which is qualified only by the requirement of reciprocity. Comparisons between the Soviet draft treaty and our draft treaty will be inevitable. Therefore, I should like to address myself to the Soviet draft treaty, in no spirit of contentiousness but in a spirit of carrying on the deliberations of this Committee, as we must. The verification provision of the Soviet draft treaty is of course modelled on the provision in the outer space Treaty for verifying that there are no military installations on the moon or other celestial bodies. But an attempt to transplant, so to speak, a provision applicable to the moon -- where all claims of national jurisdiction have been renounced -- to the sea-bed, where there are many existing claims of national jurisdiction and a growing number of scientific and commercial uses, raises many difficult political and legal questions. In addition, there would be an immense technical problem in living up to such an unqualified verification provision in the hostile environment of the sea-bed. For

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example, the entry of an observer into any installation on the sea-bed, if it is at great depth and, as a result, at great pressure, would be both difficult and dangerous. The solution of that problem might require special equipment designed for each particular type of installation. The entry into even one installation, in addition to being hazardous, could take lengthy preparation and be extremely expensive. In order to avoid complicated efforts to establish any such procedure at this time, the United States proposes a simple and straightforward verification system based on observation and consultation to resolve any questions as to compliance with the treaty which the observation might have raised.

15. The United States believes such a system would be workable. In my statement on 15 May I set forth the reasons why the emplacing or fixing on the ocean floor of an installation that was capable of serving as part of an effective weapons system involving nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction would be unlikely to escape the attention of other maritime Powers (ENDC/PV.411, para. 25). If other maritime Powers became aware of this activity, as we believe they would, and if they suspected a violation of the treaty, they could act under the observation provision of article III of the United States draft. Let us consider the role this observation could play in verifying compliance with the treaty.

16. If the installation had a configuration which could contain a missile for delivery of a nuclear weapon, and apertures or hatches from which such a missile could be launched, this would be observable. If the installation had communications facilities for a sophisticated command and control system, this might also be observed. And if the installation contained an airlock, designed to permit entry of personnel, or contained large detachable parts, which could be detached for maintenance, this too could be observed.

17. All the questions raised by those observations would have to be resolved by the consultation provided for in article III, and the other party would be committed to co-operate to resolve them. I can assure the Committee that if the United States were to request consultations under this article, it would not propose to let the consultations drop until its questions were satisfactorily resolved.

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18. I might add that this procedure for verification, involving observation and consultation, would be available to all parties to the treaty.

19. In our view, international consultation would thus play an important role in the treaty's provision for verification without the need for a special international verification organization, which we would consider as both premature and wasteful of resources.

20. The United States believes that the verification procedure set forth in article III of this draft, which I have just described, is consonant with our present and developing capability to verify activities on the sea-bed. We also believe that it is appropriate to protect against the threat that we have reason to be concerned about both now and in the immediate future. But the draft treaty we are presenting today provides that five years after its entry into force a review conference will be held. If technological and other developments warrant revision of the verification provision of the treaty, they can be considered at that time. So that there can be no doubt as to our intentions in this regard, paragraph 2 of article III expressly provides that the review conference shall consider whether any additional rights or procedures of verification should be established.

21. Article IV provides for amendments to the treaty, and is identical in language to article XV of the outer space Treaty.

22. Article V of the draft treaty we are presenting today provides for the review conference which I have already mentioned. The conference would meet here in Geneva five years after the entry into force of the treaty, and review the operation of the treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized. The provision for the review conference has been included because the United States considers the treaty as an initial undertaking in a complex environment. Accordingly, the United States believes that all parties will have an interest in ensuring that there is an opportunity to consider the effect of technological or other changes on the operation of the treaty. Article V also provides that the review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of the parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

23. Article VI of our draft treaty contains a withdrawal provision which is identical to that found in paragraph 1, article X of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*). This type of clause found its origin in a similar provision in the limited test ban Treaty (ENDC/100, Rev. 1).

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24. That completes the description of the operational clauses of the treaty. There will, of course, have to be some routine provisions dealing with the entering into force of the treaty, accesssions, official languages, and so on. But if we can agree on the operational clauses -- and, after all, these are the clauses which have been under discussion and on which differences have appeared -- then the routine provisions should not be difficult and can be worked out at a later stage of the negotiations, once progress has been made towards agreement on the substantive treaty articles.

25. In conclusion, the United States delegation has repeatedly expressed its hope that this Committee can reach a satisfactory agreement which would prevent the nuclear arms race from spreading to the sea-bed. Likewise, we are convinced that such an agreement must be reached quickly, since it might be much more difficult, and perhaps not possible, to reach agreement once deployments had started. It is for these reasons that the draft treaty which we have submitted today does not attempt to solve all the problems at once. Rather it is designed to be a realistic and important first step towards more comprehensive disarmament. That is why we have included a provision that would subject the treaty to review and to possible amendment in the light of the experience gained in its operation and of technological developments which could bear on such issues as, for example, verification.

26. Finally, I should like to add that I believe the draft treaty we have submitted today provides a sound basis for negotiating a realistic and meaningful agreement -- one which will add a significant restraint to the nuclear arms race, and, at the same time, help to ensure that the resources of the sea-bed are used for the benefit of all countries.

27. Mr. CARACCIOLO (Italy) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to say that we listened with the greatest attention and keenest interest to the statement just made by the representative of the United States. I should like to assure him that my delegation will study very carefully the text which he has submitted (ENDC/249).

28. In my statement today I wish first to deal with the problem of the cessation of underground nuclear explosions. I have waited until the end of this session to expound to the Committee the Italian point of view on this question because I had hoped that the highly technical discussion which had been started on this subject between a number of delegations would provide us with new elements that might change our position.

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29. Unfortunately, the development of that discussion, which was highly interesting and constructive, has clearly shown that the crucial problem of verification and control is still the stumbling block in the way of the conclusion of an agreement. Nevertheless, a number of delegations have made a very effective contribution to the study of this problem. The Swedish delegation in particular has played -- if I may say so -- the part of a leader by enabling us to benefit from the results of the work of its scientists, by submitting a draft treaty (ENDC/242) which is very useful and also by taking the initiative for an informal meeting at which the Minister of State, Mrs. Myrdal, provided us with more complete explanations of her points of view. However I believe that the general opinion is that we can hardly expect to reach an agreement on a total cessation of underground nuclear explosions before we have reached a compromise, acceptable to all delegations, on the problem of control.

30. Italy, for its part, cannot accept the principle that all possibilities of on-site control would be excluded. This position seems to us to be consistent with our status as a State signatory to the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). In fact -- and may I in passing express a truism -- if the non-nuclear-weapon States had adopted a similar principle last year a treaty on non-proliferation would probably not have been concluded.

31. But one -- and not the least -- of the merits of the presentation of a draft treaty by the delegation of Sweden is to impel the other delegations, faced with precise proposals, to seek possible alternatives. I hope I am not mistaken in attributing this intention to the Swedish representative. The alternative, in our opinion, can be sought only in partial solutions designed to reduce the differences between the opposing theses.

32. From that point of view we appreciate especially the position taken by the representative of Canada (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 81 et. seq.). A more thorough study of the seismological data, that is to say, a study of their importance in order to obtain an effective international exchange in this field -- an idea which moreover is contemplated in article II of the Swedish draft treaty -- seems to us to constitute a step in the right direction. We therefore support the Canadian suggestion (ENDC/PV.404, para.87) to bring together a group of experts to consider the organization of such an international exchange and to report upon this subject. We also support the other Canadian idea (ibid., para.89), that various countries should draw up a list of all seismic stations from which they would be ready to supply records in the framework of a world-wide exchange of data.

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33. We also wish to express our appreciation of the proposal presented by the United States delegation on 5 December 1968 to the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations for international co-operation in seismic research by means of a series of nuclear explosions under the Plowshare programme, (A/C.1/PV.1630, provisional, pp.18-20). In this respect we would be grateful if the United States delegation, at a time which it felt to be most appropriate, would be good enough to let us know the practical measures it has in mind.

34. In August 1968 the Italian delegation presented to this Committee a working paper on underground nuclear explosions (ENDC/234). In that document we suggested that the regulation of underground explosions for peaceful purposes should provisionally be separated from the regulation of underground explosions of a purely military nature. This separation, in our opinion, had the advantage of facilitating an agreement on the control of military explosions -- at least until scientific and technological progress enabled the total control of all explosions to be guaranteed.

35. The fact that we have today reached a standstill on the subject of control seems to me to prove that our approach, aimed also at a partial agreement, can constitute a new point of departure for a useful discussion.

36. In any event, and even if a comprehensive agreement could be reached today on the prohibition of all nuclear explosions, it would be necessary to face the particular problem of allowing, that is to say of controlling, underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. There is no doubt -- and this is clearly indicated in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty -- that peaceful explosions must be allowed and must be carried out under strict international control in order to avoid the danger of any deviation from their original purpose. This international control must be exercised both if the nuclear States carried out such explosions on their own territory and if they carried them out on territory not their own at the request of a third State or an international organization.

37. Today we therefore wish to remind the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of that suggestion contained in document ENDC/234. At the same time, and bearing in mind the opinions which have been expressed around this table as well as the events which have occurred in the meantime -- I am referring, of course, to the approval of the non-proliferation Treaty by the United Nations General Assembly -- we should like to suggest a slight change in our original proposal. In our working pape which I have already mentioned, we proposed that communications relating to the intention

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to carry out one or more nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be addressed to the United Nations. It seems to us today, bearing in mind also General Assembly resolution 2456 C (XXIII) (ENDC/237), that these communications should rather be addressed to an international service for explosions for peaceful purposes within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Similarly, the non-nuclear-weapon States mentioned in our original proposal could submit their lists of experts to the IAEA rather than to the governments of the States in which the explosion is to take place. For the sake of clarity I wanted to draw attention to this small change in a working document[3/] -- which I shall ask the Secretariat of the Conference to be good enough to circulate -- representing mere modification of our previous working paper (ENDC/234).

38. We are convinced that our proposal would facilitate the establishment of international regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We also think that it would enable scientists and technicians of the non-nuclear-weapon States to extend their knowledge of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Lastly, we think that the adoption of our proposal would be a first step towards the implementation of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty.

39. I should like now to dwell upon another point in our agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) -- namely, measures relating to the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. We consider, in fact, that because of their political, military and psychological importance such measures deserve the utmost attention on the part of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Moreover, we already expressed this conviction when our priorities for defining the programme of work of the Conference were put forward (ENDC/PV.385, paras 44 et seq.). At that time we noted with satisfaction (ibid., para.50) that a proposal for the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and for the reduction and elimination of stockpiles was included in the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968 (ENDC/227). Although the Soviet proposal was different in character from that aimed at ending the production of fissionable materials, we considered that it reflected the desire of the Soviet Union to undertake negotiations in this field and that it could consequently form the prelude to a more thorough study of this problem.

40. Subsequently, we took note with great interest of the statements made on 8 April by the representative of the United States on the problem of the "cut-off" (ENDC/PV.401, paras. 5-17). The fact that the United States Government has decided to renew and

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3/ Circulated as document ENDC/250

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bring up to date the 1964 proposal (ENDC/134) must in our opinion be looked upon as an important and positive contribution to the work of the Conference in a field which is followed with particular attention by the militarily non-nuclear States. The point in the proposal made by Ambassador Fisher on 8 April which has particularly aroused our interest is the one relating to the application of controls. His new proposal in fact makes it possible to overcome the difficulty constituted by the criterion of mutual inspections which was at the basis of the previous United States proposal. It is thus a very substantial improvement for States which, not having installations for the production of fissionable material and consequently not having any counterpart to offer, would be practically excluded from any control mechanism whatsoever based on the criterion of reciprocity.

41. Moreover, this new United States proposal facilitates the implementation of the principle of universality of controls, a principle which we strongly supported during the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty. It is designed in fact to subject the nuclear countries, so far as their production of fissionable material is concerned, to the same controls by IAEA as the non-proliferation Treaty imposes on non-nuclear countries for their peaceful nuclear activities. The institution of those controls, which obviously would extend to the entire process of peaceful utilization of fissionable material produced in the future, would therefore be tantamount to the setting up of a single control system for the nuclear countries as well as for the non-nuclear countries. With all discrimination thus abolished, this measure would contribute, moreover, to increasing the effectiveness and even the duration of the non-proliferation Treaty.

42. We have noted that in his statement of 10 April (ENDC/PV.402, paras. 41 et seq.) the representative of the Soviet Union did not make any specific criticisms of the IAEA control system proposed by the United States delegation. With respect to the more general criticisms of the United States proposal that have been made I should merely like to point out that while it is true that the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes would not lead to a reduction in the present stockpiles of nuclear weapons, this does not prove that the nuclear Powers must continue to increase indefinitely their production of fissionable material.

43. The cessation of the production of fissionable materials, especially if it went hand in hand with the making available for peaceful purposes of a part of the stockpile, would, in our opinion, be a very important first step towards the cessation of vertical proliferation and also of the production of nuclear weapons, which is called for by the

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Soviet memorandum. That first step therefore represents the prerequisite for the following step, and because it is designed to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence between the two major nuclear Powers it could not fail to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflict.

44. Lastly, and to revert to the idea to which I referred earlier, the measure in question would have the advantage of releasing for peaceful purposes substantial resources which are now used for military activities. The Italian delegation is particularly sensitive to that aspect of the United States proposal, which in some ways is connected with our own proposal of 1 August 1967 for making available part of the fissionable materials for peaceful purposes (ENDC/PV.318, paras. 15-21). I should like to add that the United States proposal could make control easier for the nuclear Powers themselves. Indeed it is obvious that once all production of fissionable material for military purposes had ceased, controls could be more easily accepted without fear of finding oneself exposed to the dangers of espionage in the fields of defence and national security.

In conclusion, it seems to us that the United States proposal could bring us substantially closer to the achievement of a certain uniformity of conditions between the nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear Powers. That is not the least of its merits.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 414th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Tomas Lahoda, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America and Italy.

"The delegation of the United States of America submitted a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor (ENDC/249).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 23 May, 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.415
23 May 1969
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 23 May 1969, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia)

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69-35407

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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
	Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
	Mr. N.S. KISHILOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
United States of America:	Mr. A.S. FISHER
	Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the 415th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): At this last meeting of the Committee before the recess I am grateful to have the opportunity to summarize and underline once again the views of my delegation on the test ban issue, to try to answer some of the queries which have been raised by other delegations in regard to the contents of the working paper put forward by the Swedish delegation on 1 April and contained in document ENDC/242 and, finally, in my turn to pose one or two questions in the hope that they will be answered after the recess.

3. Before doing so I should like, however, to state that although the Swedish delegation has come to, as it were, "specialize" on the test ban, we also attach great importance to the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. We have long considered the test ban, the cut-off and the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) as parts of one and the same parcel, as they would assure qualitative and quantitative freezes on nuclear weapons development. The intervention on the cut-off made in the Committee by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Fisher, on 8 April (ENDC/PV.401, paras. 50-217) was of great interest. Particularly gratifying, of course, was his suggestion that the verification of a cut-off agreement should be handled in the same manner as is prescribed in the non-proliferation Treaty, namely through reliance entirely on the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This would mean in practice -- as was also pointed out by Mr. Fisher -- that a system of safeguards would come into effect which would be equal for all States signatories to the two treaties -- the cut-off treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty -- and which would cover the production of fissionable materials of all those countries.

4. In an intervention on 10 April, the representative of the Soviet Union commented on the cut-off in a rather negative way. Ambassador Roshchin said:

> "... this proposal would not lead to the reduction of existing arsenals of nuclear weapons and would not diminish the possibility of the further production of such weapons." (ENDC/PV.402, para. 77)

He added that

> "it would not solve the problem of eliminating or reducing the threat of a nuclear war, even if all nuclear Powers agreed to carry out this measure." (ibid.)

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5. That argumentation against a cut-off agreement does not seem very convincing to my delegation. As has already been pointed out in this Committee, all the measures in the nuclear weapons field discussed so far are concerned with "freezing" the existing situation in order to stop the nuclear arms race. When such a freeze or de-escalation has been achieved, the next steps can be taken on firm ground, steps towards measures of real disarmament, towards cutting down and eventually eliminating existing stocks of nuclear weapons.

6. The time now seems over-ripe for the thorough preparation of agreements both on a cut-off and on a test ban, as those two measures are so closely connected with the first attempt to begin reducing nuclear weapons installations -- that is, with the planned strategic arms limitation talks. Yes, those two treaties which we in the Eighteen-Nation Committee could and should now elaborate would serve as supporting pillars to a strategic arms limitation agreement. As a matter of sheer logic, if strategic arms are to be cut down, the need for producing material for nuclear weapons and for testing new ones will obviously be reduced.

7. I wish to propose, therefore, that the Committee, as soon as we resume work after the recess, should take a new look at the cut-off. As has been done on the test-ban issue, some delegation in our midst ought to present a working paper containing suitable language for a treaty text. Only in such a way, I think, can our further discussion become really concrete and, we hope, conclusive.

8. The United States delegation has coupled its declared willingness to enter such a treaty with an offer to make available for peaceful purposes considerable quantities of fissionable materials. I presume that these materials would be put at the disposal of other States also, and particularly the less-developed ones. This generous gesture gives added weight to the proposed cut-off and to its urgency.

9. May I be allowed to point to the challenging feature running through several of the disarmament measures on our present agenda (ENDC/236, p.3), namely, that they foster new hopes for a more international sharing of technological benefits. As with the resources of the sea-bed, so it is with those to be released by peaceful nuclear explosions and that atomic energy which is now embedded in non-profitable nuclear weapons. Particularly for the sake of the underdeveloped countries, these hopes must not prove to be illusions.

10. Let me now turn to the test-ban issue. Practically all other delegations have by now made comments on our working paper. We are grateful for the support which has

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been lent both to our initiative in submitting this paper and to most of its contents. It is my intention today to try to answer some of the questions and comment on some of the ideas raised by other delegations.

11. It has been customary to treat the test ban issue as divided between a scientific or technical aspect and a political aspect. But we have found that this terminology lacks precision, a fact which may be the cause of some misunderstanding. It is more accurate to state that each of those terms refers to two different situations. It is therefore more helpful to separate what are called the technical aspects in the following way: first -- those of method -- what kind of bases it would be scientifically possible to utilize, and second, which of these capabilities have practical applicability within the institutional system existing today. Also, the political decisions will be addressed, on the one hand, to the steps for the practical arrangements -- installations, data exchange, and so on -- which are needed for improved application of the technically available methods; and, on the other hand, to the overriding political decision to sign or not to sign a treaty, necessarily coupled with national decisions to stop or not to stop testing. While it is the task of scientists to continue to study control methods, and to select those which best meet the requirements of governments, it must be for the governments to state clearly what degree of precision is needed, what deterrence level would be considered satisfactory, and so on. It is also a scientific or rather a technical job to blueprint the installations required to apply the verification methods in practice, but it is certainly the task of governments to decide on such practical arrangements.

12. I shall try to employ that kind of distinction to make some points clearer than in our intervention on 1 April (ENDC/PV.399, paras. 7 et seq.); that is, technically possible methods to be kept separate from methods which are practical at present, and political decisions relating on the one hand to the extension of practical capabilities and on the other to the major issue of agreeing on a disarmament measure.

13. The first representative to make detailed comments on our working paper and on my intervention of 1 April was the representative of the United States, Ambassador Fisher. Mr. Fisher said that:

> "The United States cannot accept the statement advanced in support of the recent Swedish working paper that there will be less than one ambiguous event, or 'false alarm', in the Soviet Union every ten years".
> (ENDC/PV.401, para. 22)

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Mr. Fisher went on to say that it was the assessment of his delegation that

"there will be a large number of events each year which cannot be distinguished between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions". (ibid.)

14. If we refer to the situation of today, Mr. Fisher is certainly right. Everybody knows that there is a considerable number of nuclear events in the so-called magnitude gap, between 4.0 and 4.5, with explosions extending from one to some tens of kilotons -- 20 or 40 or 60, dependent on whether they occur in hard rock or softer environments. But the future possibilities are quite different. The Swedish delegation has made one attempt to circumscribe those future possibilities which could form a stable platform for a test ban.

15. In our interventions in 1967 and in the working paper of that year (ENDC/191) we described how decision theory can be employed to design rather effective ways of using certain kinds of seismological observations for test ban control, both in the case -- much discussed already at that time -- of a treaty with obligatory on-site inspections and also in the case -- not very much investigated at that time -- of a treaty without obligatory inspections.

16. There would be two stages of control in both kinds of treaty. In the first stage decision theory principles, or perhaps some other principles, would be used to select from all observations violation-like events, and in the second stage treaty procedure would be employed to get clarification or to verify whether they really were violations or not. I shall assume that what Mr. Fisher called "ambiguous events" or "false alarms" are these selected events. In our terminology they are violation-like events and consist, as the case might be, of real violations and of earthquakes mistaken as explosions and thus being potential false alarms. Decision theory routinely arranges the selection process so that the percentage of violations separated for verification is high enough to provide a sufficient deterrence and at the same time so that the rate of false alarms is held down to an acceptable level. Details about such employment of decision theory are to be found in document ENDC/191 and in a subsequent report from the Research Institute of National Defence in Stockholm, entitled "Seismological Test Ban Control", of February 1968.

17. Let us now examine the second stage -- and to begin with, in the case of a treaty with obligatory inspections. There the verification procedure would consist of the performance of a certain number of on-site inspections, each with a certain practical effectiveness, less than perfect but good enough to provide the required deterrence -- in our numerical calculations we chose to estimate effectiveness of inspections at 50

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per cent. The potentially false alarms would then be cleared up through the inspections and an accusation of breach of treaty would be made only if conclusive evidence of a nuclear explosion was found or, more realistically, I think, if the performance of proper on-site inspection had been refused or obstructed.

18. In the case of a treaty without obligatory inspection, this described verification by obligatory inspection would, of course, not be available. In our intervention on 1 April and in document ENDC/242 we therefore proposed an alternative treaty procedure to handle this verification problem, namely the so-called verification by challenge. Our proposal was based on several notions. One of them was that "false alarms" can be made to be rare events if identification capabilities are developed as suggested by us. The effort which a suspected party would want to make to free itself on such rare occasions would thus not constitute a very heavy burden on the treaty parties. Another of our notions was that the treaty procedure suggested by us would, on the basis of the improved identification capabilities I just mentioned, be efficient enough to maintain the required deterrent against violations. Both those notions have been challenged by the United States representative and I now want to try to "free" myself.

19. First, I turn to the point about the low rate of false alarms. Here it is necessary to keep the distinction I indicated between possible method and practical application. Our notion of the feasibility of fewer false alarms than one every ten years rests originally on our 1967 application of decision theory to the particular identification method described in 1964 by Brooker and Mitronovas, which is a method of identification over regional distances and based on data going rather far down into the magnitude gap. This was at that time a very encouraging methodological result from United States measuring stations in a regional network around United States explosions and earthquakes, that is, not relying on teleseismic observations. Whether something like that will be applicable also to other regions, including those of particular interest to the United States, will certainly depend on the practical arrangements provided in a treaty situation, and this is largely a matter for political decision. In my intervention on 1 April, I therefore stressed the importance of organizing data exchange and establishing automatic stations for the extraction of regional data (ENDC/PV.399, paras. 31 and 32). Both arrangements would be particular instances of practical applications of methods which are available in principle.

20. Of course, the whole situation would be eased if such low false alarm rates were to be attainable by teleseismic means. At present such monitoring of the numerous weak events, in the lower magnitude ranges, does not seem to be available. This is

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therefore a problem still unsolved, where improvements both of identification methods and of practical arrangements for measurements are necessary. Here the large teleseismic array stations, particularly when placed in different regions of the world, seem to offer the best possibilities for progress.

21. In passing, let me say that I am afraid that the representative of the United States in his intervention on 8 April (ENDC/PV.401, para. 21) overestimated the coverage of identification capabilities by last year's report on seismic verification of the Seismic Study Group of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research of Sweden (SIPRI)(ENDC/230). The SIPRI meeting actually did not take the capabilities of large arrays into account for the important conclusions. This remains to be done and we would value highly another experts' meeting doing so.

22. A very profound change in the identification capabilities, which was not dealt with in Mr. Fisher's critical intervention, would be brought about by the organized international exchange of seismological data which we have mentioned in article 11, paragraph 2 of our suggested treaty text (ENDC/242). I referred to this measure in my speech on 1 April as promising a considerable improvement in comparison with present control capabilities (ENDC/PV.399, para. 32). At the same time I mentioned other improvements which could be derived from seismological stations of a classical type, properly located (ibid., para. 28). They might be made automatic and sealed, and should be linked up with the international network of data exchange.

23. Several other representatives have taken up the matter of seismological data exchange in their recent statements. I feel that I have to pay a special tribute to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff, for his very efficient promotion of immediate steps towards an effective data exchange (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 78-90), and now again in the working paper submitted today (ENDC/251).

24. Mr. Ignatieff pointed out, as other representatives have done, that the task of identification would be facilitated if guaranteed access to all original seismological data were to be provided. For the investigation of certain particular events, data from a few dozen up to perhaps a few hundred records would be important. The problem was therefore, he said "to devise a system by which their availability could be guaranteed within an acceptable and practicable interval of time" (ENDC/PV.404, para. 83). He suggested, as a possible arrangement, governmental guarantees to supply tape records or microfilms, with supporting background technical information, upon the demand of any requesting government within an agreed time interval (ibid., para. 84) That is precisely what has been discussed as very desirable among experts from eight

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governments -- among them Sweden and Canada -- which for the last couple of years have been concerned with bringing about the so-called "detection club". Mr. Ignatieff has made several very interesting suggestions in regard to the organizational problems involved in setting up the international data exchange. We want to support warmly such an activation of international co-operation in the seismic detection and identification fields.

25. The representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mullay, was, of course, right in drawing our attention in his intervention on 17 April (ibid., para. 13) to the fact that several international seismic data centres already exist, such as the ones in Edinburgh, Washington and Moscow. But they are not as yet functioning as needed in relation to a test ban.

26. Before him, on 10 April, the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Zelleke, spoke of the need for further research in the seismological field and stressed the idea of a joint international effort to this effect (ENDC/PV. 402, para. 103).

27. These suggestions were commented upon by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Lahoda, in his interesting intervention in the Committee on the test-ban issue on 29 April (ENDC/PV.407, paras. 8-10). He felt, however, that the right time to consider them would be after reasonable progress had been achieved on the crux of the problem, namely, the question of the political willingness to stop testing. We beg to differ just on this point of timing. The structure of the test ban has to be established now and the technical services needed, not least the data exchange, have to begin to be organized now.

28. International co-operation for providing a data flow, however, obviously does not have technical aspects alone. Governments must be willing to decide to participate. In this connexion, I wish to add our appreciation to that already expressed by others, of the recent statements by the representatives of two of the nuclear-weapon Powers, the Soviet Union, indicating its willingness to take part in an organized exchange of national seismological data as part of a comprehensive test ban (ENDC/PV.402, para. 72) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.396, para. 27) stressing its readiness to take an active part in establishing such a system. United States representatives have on earlier occasions expressed the same willingness, but it would be of great value if this standpoint could be reiterated at this stage of our negotiations. I shall return somewhat later to the question of how soon specific work for this purpose might be initiated.

29. In view of the many constructive suggestions made in regard to international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, I venture strongly to recommend that in

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our report to the General Assembly of the United Nations this matter should be more than briefly mentioned. It marks considerable progress towards laying the foundation for a comprehensive test ban treaty, and ought to be made visible to all United Nations delegations.

30. I shall now try to answer some of the queries which have been raised in connexion with the treaty draft contained in the Swedish working paper. The general measure of support that our ideas have obtained so far is quite encouraging.

31. Representatives have dealt mainly with one or two crucial provisions of our text rendered in articles I and II and I shall do the same today.

32. Article I, paragraph 1 contains the prohibition against all underground nuclear weapon test explosions. Paragraph 2 ensures the prohibition against collaboration with any third party for the carrying out of such explosions. The contents of both those provisions are identical with corresponding provisions of the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). No objection has been raised in the Committee against them. On the contrary, this complete prohibition of underground nuclear tests has been greeted with appreciation by some representatives, for instance, by the representative of Czechoslovakia on 29 April (ENDC/PV.407, para.6). It is, of course, the very core of a comprehensive test ban. But if we are to satisfy the newly awakened demand for using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, an exception from the general rpohibitory rule must be made for them. Paragraph 3 of article I provides for that exception, namely, if such explosions are made to take place "in conformity with an international agreement to be negotiated separately".

33. In this connexion I wish to quote the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Frazão, who said on 8 May:

> "We consider that the working paper presented by the Swedish delegation deals with the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in a logical and well-balanced manner: it sets forth the general and universal rule of the prohibition that is applicable to all countries, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, without any loopholes, and leaves the question of the regulation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes -- which must be negotiated separately in another context -- to be the subject of a special international agreement." (ENDC/PV.409, para.12)

34. The representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador Khallaf, in his intervention on 15 April reminded us of the obvious link between the provision in our suggested article I, paragraph 3 and the one in article V of the non-proliferation

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Treaty, also dealing with the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions. He said in that connexion: "We believe that it is self-evident that this important subject should receive identical treatment in both these treaties". (ENDC/PV.403, para. 26) My answer is that there should not be, and there is not, any contradiction between the two provisions.

35. Mr. Mulley, in his speech on 17 April, touched on the same question when he asked if the international agreement mentioned in paragraph 3 of our article I was envisaged as being the same as that referred to in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty ENDC/PV.404, para. 10). Again, my answer is positive: it is intended to be one and the same "special international agreement", as it is to legislate the international regulations relating to the same nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. But let me be quite clear: the special agreement will have to be negotiated quite soon. If only the non-proliferation Treaty is then in existence, the coverage of the provisions about control might not be total, that is, explosions in the territories of nuclear-weapon Powers would not then need to be covered. On this point one would, of course, have to study more closely the suggestions made yesterday by the representative of Italy (ENDC/PV.414, paras. 34 et seq.)

36. But a further step will be indicated in the context of the comprehensive test ban, when not only explosions performed in non-nuclear-weapon States should be regulated so as not to permit them to acquire nuclear weapons, but all nuclear-weapon tests -- that is, specifically underground explosions within all signatory countries and performed by any signatory State must be encompassed by the prohibition. The "special international agreement" which I have so far discussed will have to be formulated in such a way that it can take care of an extension of its coverage to nuclear-weapon States also. The technical problem in connexion with control of peaceful nuclear explosions will then be: how can it be ascertained that they are not exploited for military purposes? The handling of the explosive devices as such and also the preparations and installations, particularly those for making diagnostic measurements of the devices, must be submitted to international observation.

37. I must revert, however, to one remark made by Mr. Mulley. I know that several delegations are preoccupied with the same concern. It refers to the very last sentence in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. Mr. Mulley pointed out what he called "a significant difference of language as the non-proliferation Treaty permits bilateral agreements in addition to 'special international agreement or agreements'". (ENDC/PV.404, para.10)

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38. Our interpretation is quite simple: the "special international agreement" is to provide the overriding regulations on how to handle peaceful nuclear explosions as such -- on foreign territories, as long as we have only the non-proliferation Treaty. Recourse will always be had, on the other hand, to bilateral agreements to settle the conditions for a special project, the modalities, not least the financial conditions, and so on, between a particular nuclear-weapon Power and a particular beneficiary government, altogether free now but only if "pursuant to" the general international rules when they have been settled in the international agreement.

39. I am sorry if this excursion into the field of peaceful nuclear explosions has been a bit time-consuming, but I know that it is a cause of great concern, not to say of some worry, to a number of countries, particularly those underprivileged, so far, economically in a world full of riches.

40. I now have to turn to article II in our suggested text, dealing with control. When introducing this text in the Committeee on 1 April, I said that we did not wish to take a rigid attitude in this matter (ENDC/PV.399, para. 37). Our text was intended as a compromise between the until-now widely different standpoints of the two main Powers, and intended to entice them into coming forward with more precise alternatives than hitherto. The procedure for verification proposed in our text has to be seen and judged as a whole. It is not rewarding to lift out parts of it and say, "Look, this text contains hardly any binding obligations on a suspected party". We, and many others, hold that it does. Paragraph 1, containing a solemn undertaking by all parties to co-operate in good faith to clarify events, is definitely a binding obligation. Paragraph 2, containing an undertaking by all parties to collaborate in an effective international exchange of seismological data, is a binding obligation. To take on that obligation as binding will be in the interests of all parties, considering the mass of valuable information they will obtain in return.

41. On paragraph 3 of article II, dealing with what we have called "verification by challange", the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Lahoda, in his intervention on 29 April asked for:

> "a more detailed explanation of the interrelationship between the provisions of paragraph 3 (b) and 3 (c) of article II and their relationship to paragraph 4 of that article". (ENDC/PV.407, para. 7)

42. Over the years I have several times tried to present this Committee with as succinct a description as possible of the procedure for veritication which has been generally referred to as "verification by challenge". I shall try once again, referring now to the wording in the provisions mentioned by Mr. Lahoda.

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43. We consider it of primary importance that a treaty banning underground nuclear tests should contain provisions by which a party wrongly suspected of having violated the treaty can speedily free itself of suspicion. We hold that this is the main concern in this matter. We have organized such provisions in a three-step series of ascending severity. Under article II, paragraph 3(a), a party is supposed to give explanations. In paragraph 3(b) it is provided that the party might make use of the possibility to invite the suspecting party and/or any other State or some international organ or committee to an inspection of the suspected violation, that inspection to be carried out in a manner which the inviting State itself should prescribe. It may be said, of course, that this is a right which any party to the treaty would have anyway and that it is superfluous to spell out the right in the treaty. We think it is valuable, however: it indicates a speedy and easy way for parties to free themselves of suspicion -- and this is of practical value not least to smaller States.

44. To reply to Mr. Lahoda, there is to my mind no intrinsic connexion between the provision offering that possibility in paragraph 3(b) and the following one in paragraph 3(c), under which the parties are entitled to make additional proposals as to suitable methods of clarification. Paragraph 3(c) is, one might say, a residual category for use of any method of clarification. A demand for an ad hoc inspection in the territory of a suspected party is thus not excluded. I can quite see, however, that this is precisely the focal point of controversy between those who insist on and those who oppose obligatory inspections.

45. Now, as to paragraph 4 of article II, if the various measures indicated in the earlier provisions of that article have failed to clarify a suspicious event to the full satisfaction of a suspecting party, paragraph 4 establishes the right for that party to bring the matter to the attention of the United Nations Security Council and the other parties to the treaty. That formula has been used in other treaties. It is here intended to provide an opportunity for further airing of contested statements about facts. This does not mean, however, that all the measures enumerated in the previous parts of the article, such as the inspection-by-invitation procedure mentioned in paragraph 3(b), need to have been involved. The reporting to the Security Council entails no sanction: the provision is largely of political value. The possibility of a debate in the Security Council may be considered as a kind of safety-valve for a suspected party to state its case and, of course, generally, to give added weight to deterrence.

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46 I have also to deal with one fairly general complaint mentioned by several speakers, namely that the whole machinery we have envisaged is too weak.

47. In his speech on 15 May the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Sule Kolo, made the plea for what he called "a fool-proof system of verification" (ENDC/PV.411, para.10) At the same time he presented a working paper on the subject (ENDC/246) in which he recommended that the idea raised last year by the United Kingdom delegation for a committee to undertake on-site inspections in suspicious cases should be seriously studied again. The Nigerian delegation recommends in its paper that such a committee should be composed exclusively of non-aligned countries responding to certain criteria.

48. On condition that it was generally acceptable, we would be happy to go along with that idea. However, that is probably not the case. Already in 1962 the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament launched the idea of a special commission to determine and carry out on-site inspections (ENDC/28). For about two years much work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was devoted to considering such an international commission, but in the final instance it was not accepted.

49. A much more fundamental issue, raised both by Mr. Fisher and Mr. Sule Kolo, is that of verification with or without inspection. Certainly, there cannot be a difference as great as between 100 per cent for one method of deterrence and zero for another. When Ambassador Sule Kolo asked for "fool-proof" verification he knew, of course, that that was a kind of literary exaggeration: nothing like 100 per cent certainty can be foreseen in this world. But even so, we need to know more about how effective on-site inspections are. After all, they depend on achieving precision with regard to epicentre location and quite a set of favourable modalities. The literature on inspections is full of queries and doubts. In our statistical analysis we estimated 50 per cent probability of success. This is a very important question which I address to all proponents of on-site inspections: exactly how efficient are they? Further, what exactly would be the required deterrence level of a treaty with obligatory inspection? In our estimates of capabilities attainable in the future we used the deterrence level of 10 per cent disclosure risk.

50. One of Mr. Fisher's critical remarks in his statement on 8 April was as follows:

> "And what if one finds the explanation of the event unsatisfactory? The violator has, according to the Swedish proposal, no further obligation. Those who consider their security endangered may, of course, withdraw from the treaty,

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but the onus will be on them, not on the violator. That would give the agreement an inherent instability. In fact, any nation that wanted to resume testing openly could just conceivably use such a scheme to force others to abrogate the treaty, rather than do so themselves."
(ENDC/PV.401, para. 28)

51. Clearly, any party not willing to continue with the treaty would have the option of getting out of the treaty through the back door, so to speak, by obstructing the verification process, perhaps even with the onus distribution foreseen by Mr. Fisher. But I think that a treaty with obligatory inspections also offers the same option of backdoor exit, just by obstructing the obligatory on-site inspection procedure. With the obligatory inspection arrangements the occasions for such exits would be even much more frequent than in the arrangement proposed by us. That kind of instability thus exists in both kinds of treaty. I think, however, that any important treaty entered into by mutual agreement would be stabilized in its existence by the mutual interests of the parties, and if those mutual interests were to disappear no treaty would hold.

52. In his important intervention on 8 April, Mr. Fisher also said that one has to test our treaty proposal not only in regard to what is going to happen if false alarms are struck but also in regard to what happens if a violation occurs (ibid., para. 26). Of course, that is so and here I should like again to remark that in our verification-by-challenge process a violator would in reality most probably obstruct co-operation in verification. But that is no different from the case with verification by obligatory on-site inspection. A violator would certainly not permit any such on-site inspection of a violation; he would again simply obstruct the on-site inspection procedure. Or he would disengage himself from the treaty before any verification process was attempted.

53. I hope that in this way I have also given arguments against that part of Mr. Fisher's statement on 8 April where he said: "Obligatory on-site inspections would, we believe, add a sufficiently binding constraint." (ibid., para. 29)

54. I want to add that we were very gratified yesterday when the representative of the United States in his sea-bed treaty proposal (ENDC/249) suggested a verification procedure rather similar to our challenge procedure for the underground test ban (ENDC/PV.414, para. 12 et seq).

55. Let me finally deal with a very important point made by Mr. Mulley. He reminded us (ENDC/PV.404, para. 17) of his proposal from last year allowing for a phasing-out of nuclear-weapon testing by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground test explosions, leading to zero over a small number of years (ENDC/232). The representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Zelleke, in his speech on 10 April suggested that this idea find a

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place in the Swedish treaty text (ENDC/PV.402, para. 106). Our delegation is not at all negative to Mr. Mulley's proposal, if it is acceptable to others, but we do not believe it should be embodied in a major treaty, intended to stand from here to eternity. An agreement about intermediate provisions should rather find its place in some annex or protocol. The adoption of the idea as such would seem to us valuable on condition that the time be used as a warming-up period for the international data exchange and other arrangements for improving verification capabilities. This would give us a cue to the timing problem: prepare the whole structure of the test ban this summer; report to the United Nations on progress made; sign the treaty and/or the transitory regulations when the strategic arms limitation talks are under way; and then start immediately to build up the verification capabilities.

56. The representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, on 10 April made some concrete suggestions as to our method of work which would fit in with such a schedule. He said that available drafts, such as the one contained in our working paper should be considered by the Committee

> "... in a methodical and orderly manner, paragraph by paragraph if necessary. Thus we would in due course be able to transmit to the General Assembly documents which either had received the unanimous approval of the Committee or contained at least a considerable part on which there had been a consensus in the Committee, although there might still exist some differences of opinion on some of the provisions, perhaps even fundamental differences. As regards these last, that is the provisions on which differences of opinion still exist, one could include in parallel columns alternative texts already drafted in the form of articles, or paragraphs of articles, for insertion in the treaty which is being elaborated ...
>
> "In short, we believe that after seven years of general discussion, the time has come to proceed, in regard to various items on our agenda, to the consideration of what in the General Assembly are draft resolutions and in our case should be draft treaties." (ENDC/PV. 402, paras. 33 and 35)

57. I have quoted from Ambassador Garcia Robles' statement at some length because I think it is important and because it so well reflects the views of my delegation on the proper working methods of the Committee, not only on the test ban issue but also on several other disarmament measures ahead of us.

58. Finally, I should like to turn to the representatives of the main nuclear-weapon Powers. Somewhat earlier, I indicated in passing that I would want to pose some major policy questions to them, considering that the controversy hinges on one

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specific point, related to article II, paragraph 3(b) and (c) and paragraph 4 of our paper. First, can we expect to get the position which relies on obligatory inspections spelled out in specific terms and with a scientific background so that a detailed comparison can be made without proposal as an alternative? Secondly, would the co-Chairmen accept the remainder of our draft as a basis for negotiation? The Eighteen-Nation Committee could then proceed with great speed to outline the structure of a comprehensive test ban and report accordingly to the United Nations.

59. I have today quoted from earlier interventions by many of my colleagues. I shall end this lengthy statement with one final quotation to support my basic conviction that a political decision on the comprehensive test ban must be arrived at with great urgency. The quotation I have in mind is intimately related to the test ban issue. It goes back almost six years. It has been taken from an address by the then President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, to the American people on 26 July 1963, after the conclusion of the negotiations in Moscow on the partial test-ban Treaty. This address is reproduced in full in document ENDC/102. President Kennedy wanted to calm those who might find a disarmament agreement risky. He said:

> "But it would be a mistake to assume that this Treaty will be quickly broken.
>
> "The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialled and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgement, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interest, for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty, and such risks in this treaty are small, the far greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risk of a nuclear arms race, the risk of new nuclear Powers, nuclear pollution, and nuclear war." (ENDC/102, pp.6 and 7)

60. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): I should like to make a very few comments to introduce our working paper (ENDC/251) which has been circulated this morning and is, I hope, before each of my colleagues. I should, incidentally, like to take this

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occasion to thank the co-Chairmen for their courtesy in permitting me to follow the representative of Sweden, who has just made a most interesting and important statement. In doing so the co-Chairmen have maintained the very high standards of courtesy which have made this session so agreeable.

61. My colleagues will recall that I outlined the Canadian proposal on this subject at our informal meeting on Wednesday, and therefore I shall not impose upon their time now with a lengthy repetition of what I said then about the background. I should, however, like to stress again that this proposal is in no way intended to prejudice discussions on any other proposals on the comprehensive test ban which are now before the Committee.

62. The paper itself is, I think, more or less self-explanatory and I therefore wish to mention only two points. First, we have suggested that the Secretary-General be designated as the recipient of the information that we requested, simply because his office represents the most relevant permanent address to which States can respond to our request, whether or not the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is in session. Second, our authorities, our specialists, have told us that all the technical information which is requested in the paper is necessary for a proper assessment, eventually, of what would be required to constitute an effective world-wide exchange of seismological data.

63. We do hope that other delegations will agree that this proposal is in line with the step-by-step approach through which it seems to us that our present difficulties with a comprehensive test ban might begin to be overcome and to which the representative of Sweden has made such a notable contribution today. We also hope that delegations will study our paper during the recess and will come to a favourable decision, so that on our return the proposal may be accepted and this action may be reflected in our report to the next session of the General Assembly as constituting evidence that the Committee is carrying out the urgent mandate given to it on this important matter.

64. In fact, if the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament adopts a positive attitude to this idea, the next session of the United Nations General Assembly might be asked to pass a resolution approving of this action and calling for the co-operation of States to improve and intensify international co-operation in the exchange of seismological data.

65. Mr. FISHER, (United States of America): Today we are concluding the formal work of the spring session of this Committee. I think that this session has once again proved the worth of this Committee to the international community and to world peace.

66. The views of my own Government, as the Committee may recall, were expressed by President Nixon in his letter of 15 March to Ambassador Smith when he said: "A major part of the work of peace is done by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee" (ENDC/239,* p.2).

67. In a moment I shall discuss the foundation which our work this session has laid for possible accomplishments in the session to be held this summer. But first I should like to take a longer view. And in this connexion I would refer to the interesting thoughts raised on the working paper presented by Deputy Foreign Minister Zagari on 21 April (ENDC/245). We believe that it would indeed be a healthy exercise for this Committee to take stock of itself, to consider how much we have accomplished so far towards reaching our long range goals. I am not suggesting that we should begin anew discussion of detailed treaty texts on general and complete disarmament. I do believe, however, that we might well give some fresh thought to where we stand with respect to our longer-range objectives. This would doubtless help us view the specific measures we have under consideration not as isolated measures, but as well-ordered steps to our ultimate goal. The Italian working paper raises this point when it asks the pertinent question: are we carrying out the purposes for which our Committee was formed? It also suggests an approach which might lead to an affirmative response to that question.

68. I should now like to turn to the specific measures which have been discussed at our spring session, now concluding.

69. The United States has listened with interest to the views expressed on the subject of chemical and bacteriological warfare. In particular, we have noted the proposals made by Mr. Mulley (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 24 et seq.) and by the representative of Sweden (ENDC/PV.397, para. 99) to make more binding, or even extend, the restrictions of the Geneva Protocol. The United States supports the principles of the Geneva Protocol and has frequently noted its commitment to respect

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them. We expect that the Secretary-General's report on this subject will provide a basis for us to make further judgments on the feasibility and practicability of these proposals and those suggested by others. We would hope that a constructive discussion of this subject could be pursued during our next session after the report of the experts has been submitted.

70. On 18 March, at the opening meeting of this session, the United States reaffirmed its interest

> "in working out an international agreement that would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed" (ENDC/239*, p. 1).

The United States recently submitted a draft treaty on this subject (ENDC/249). Since we spoke on the subject at some length at our meeting yesterday (ENDC/PV.414, paras. 2 et seq.), I do not propose to deal with it in any greater detail now, other than to point out that in the view of the United States it is a realistic approach to the sea-bed problem. I should also like to point out that we included in this proposal a review clause which recognizes that the science of "oceanology" is in its infancy and that our knowledge of this environment and our capability to function in it will increase.

71. As I have indicated, the United States proposal would deal with the most urgent issue, which we believe to be the danger of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed. It extends the area of prohibition to the maximum possible extent. With respect to verification it offers the advantage of using existing rights currently enjoyed by all States, combined with consultations to resolve difficulties arising from the exercise of these rights.

72. I note that today the representative of Sweden referred to this matter, gently but unmistakably, by asking: if this type of consultation is good enough for the sea-bed, why is it not good enough for something else? That is a good question, but I think there is a ready answer -- namely that the sea-bed, a regime open to all men under the regime of the freedom of the seas, is really quite different from the interior of a country where no such regime applies. In dealing with the sea-bed, we are really dealing with quite a fortunate situation. Existing international law guarantees the freedom of the seas to all and the right to observe what goes on there. This right, of course, does not exist on land. The possibility of

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significant events in violation of a treaty occurring on or under the sea and escaping detection by someone is small, while the possibility of significant events in violation of a treaty occurring deep within the boundaries of a country and escaping detection by those who can look with only indirect and less than certain means is undoubtedly not small.

73. I believe I indicated yesterday the view of the United States that if a country were to sign a sea-bed treaty and were to be tempted to violate it, it would probably not do so by means of one installation; rather it would probably do so on a rather massive scale -- a scale that might affect the balance of power (ibid., para. 12), so we have the problem of what sort of a risk one is concerned about. I submit that this does not apply to the case of a test ban -- a treaty that is designed to remain in force for a long time. A country that had stopped testing entirely might well feel that a single test a year, or two a year, by a potential adversary could present a real threat to its security as the treaty continued in force. It would certainly present an area of instability. I think it is worth while noting, in this context, that in one of the very interesting studies made by the Swedish Government the evasion rate was hypothesized as one test a year, it being realized that that might be a cause of significant concern.

74. It is true that the United States verification procedure for the sea-bed does not provide for access to the installations, for the overwhelming physical reasons which I mentioned (ibid., para. 14) in introducing our proposal. However, as I pointed out yesterday, certain observable physical characteristics would furnish the necessary clues to the possible function of the installation and, as I stated earlier, a possible violation would probably involve a great deal of activity. In other words, in the environment of the sea-bed, once one has looked at an installation and has the right to consult, one does not really get much further by knocking on the door at a depth of, say, one thousand feet and demanding to be let in. I submit that quite the opposite is the case with the on-site inspection. I dealt with the problem of the modalities of an on-site inspection in a speech in April 1966 (ENDC/PV.254, pp. 19-23). I think that, while we have since then learned a good deal more on the subject, there is nothing we have learned that would disprove anything that might be learned because of the presence of gases and a variety of other things, which would make an on-site inspection useful. For that reason I think that the two environments -- underground within the territory of a State, and the sea-bed under an international régime -- are quite different.

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75. That brings us to the test ban. I should like to turn my attention to it, briefly, and to the proposals for a comprehensive test ban, in particular to the verification issue.

76. President Nixon in the letter which Ambassador Smith read to this Committee stated that:

> "... the United States supports the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified. In view of the fact that differences regarding verification have not permitted achievement of this key arms control measure, efforts must be made towards greater understanding of the verification issue." (ENDC/239*, p.2)

77. In my intervention of 8 April I emphasized that in our view adequate verification required obligatory on-site inspection in addition to seismic detection and identification techniques. I indicated our view that this position was based on a firm amalgam of political and scientific considerations (ENDC/PV.401, para. 19).

78. At this session considerable emphasis has been placed upon the relationship of seismic data exchange to a comprehensive test ban. I should like, therefore, to elaborate on our approach to this matter.

79. The United States believes that seismic data exchange would serve as a useful complement to an adequately verified test ban. However, if we are to form a judgment on the role of seismic data exchange in a test ban, then we must examine and judge seismic data exchange as it is today and as we can foresee it.

80. In her very interesting remarks this morning the representative of Sweden directed some observations towards the United States, and that was quite proper. I think it would probably be unwise -- although we have been engaging in quite a free exchange, and I think it is good that we have done so -- for me to attempt to reply ad lib, so to speak, to all of them. I think we shall accept in regard to many of them her invitation to supply information for the record at the forthcoming session. However, as we customarily say in this body, I do have some preliminary thoughts on some of her observations, in the context of the subject I am now discussing -- that is, data exchange.

81. The Brooker and Mitronovas study, relied upon to support the proposition that a comprehensive test ban could or might be verified without on-site inspection by seismic means alone and utilizing seismic data exchange, was based on an analysis influenced by the following factors: (a) the tests and earthquakes were in the United States; (b) the observation of the seismic events created by both of these events was made by advanced seismic stations in the United States, operated by United States employees; (c) the seismic stations were very close -- I think within 1,500 kilometres -- to the events observed; and (d) the events occurred in an area where the geological

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characteristics were quite well known -- we have been living there for a hundred years or so and we know the geology of the area fairly well. In addition, while the Brooker and Mitronovas study did include some smaller-yield events, these were not factored out, so to speak, to take into account the magnitude gap which the SIPRI report (ENDC/230) has brought to our attention.

82. The problem of the magnitude gap clearly is in all our minds if we are thinking of teleseismic means and, perhaps, to some degree of regional seismic data. But before even considering the assumptions as to the probability or ratio of detection serving as an adequate deterrent when that detection was only by seismic means and by the interesting but highly sophisticated game theory and, indeed, before considering the political stability of this type of highly technical information serving as a deterrent -- before we even get to those questions -- we shall have to have a very clear idea whether the quantity and quality of the data we would get from a seismic data exchange would be of a similar quality to data secured from United States stations on United States territory, run by United States employees and watching United States tests and United States earthquakes, all of which we know a good deal about for other reasons. Suffice it to say that as of now nothing that we have seen in the study gives us any reason to believe that seismic data exchange would eliminate, on scientific and technical considerations, the need for on-site inspections. We believe that ambiguous seismic events would still remain even with the seismic data exchange. However, the fact that the most hopeful study was based on regional seismic data means that, if we are to be serious in our work, we cannot accept the view which has been expressed here that seismic data exchange is only something to be examined and entered into after we have achieved a comprehensive test ban. It seems to me that the very fact that an interesting study put forward for the consideration of this Committee was based on regional seismic data of a high quality automatically raises a question which every one of us ought to be asking himself: Should we not, in considering these suggestions, know what seismic data we would get out of a seismic data exchange?

83. The representatives of Canada (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 82 et seq.) and the United Kingdom (ibid., paras. 13 et seq.) have addressed themselves to an analysis of the technical issues that are raised if seismic data exchange is to be effective. The representative of Canada proposed as a preliminary step that those countries which

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would be willing to participate in a seismic data exchange should submit a list of their seismic stations, together with appropriate technical information, in order to foster movement towards merging existing seismological networks into a world-wide data exchange system (ibid., para. 89). Today an interesting statement has been made by the representative of Canada and we are fortunate to have in front of us a working paper dealing with the subject (ENDC/251). We shall certainly study this paper with the greatest interest and hope to be able to make appropriate comments on it during our next session.

84. In response to the earlier Canadian proposal, I should indicate that the United States is quite prepared to make available to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a list of seismic stations in the United States from which we would be ready to supply records in a world-wide exchange of data. We would all agree, however, that there is still much to be learned in the field of detection and identification of seismic events.

85. As part of this learning process, on 25 March (ENDC/PV.397, paras. 23-25) Ambassador Smith restated a seismic investigation proposal that had originally been put forward in the United Nations General Assembly by Mr. Foster (A/C.1/PV.1630, provisional, pp.18-20). Ambassador Smith stated that in the course of this year there were two possible nuclear experiments in the United States Atomic Energy Commission's "Plowshare" programme that could be used in implementing this seismic investigation proposal.

86. Today I should like to submit a working paper (ENDC/252) which elaborates on one of those experiments and on our plan for implementing the seismic exchange proposal. This experiment, which goes under the code name of Project Rulison, will be conducted in the state of Colorado in the western United States. Originally scheduled for the latter part of this month or perhaps for June, the experiment has now for technical reasons been postponed until September.

87. The working paper describes the implementation of our seismic investigation proposal with respect to Project Rulison. All that data will be available to all interested States and organizations, which will be able to analyse the data. Each State can derive for itself the benefits of those analyses. The results of this experiment and, we hope, others in the future, can then be discussed in relevent scientific and technical forums. This analysis of that experiment should enable

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the seismic investigation proposal to facilitate further advancement in seismic technology and increasing international exchange of information in this field. Furthermore, we shall have here a concrete example of co-operation in seismic data exchange, which will undoubtedly serve as some measure of the possible usefulness of seismic data exchange to provide progress in this field.

88. I should now like to make a brief observation regarding the cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, a measure strongly supported by the United States. We have been deeply gratified by the positive remarks concerning that measure which were made by many delegations in this Committee.

89. The United States suggestion for verifying a cut-off, as revised on 8 April (ENDC/PV.401, paras. 7 and 8), involves applying the same standards to the nuclear-weapon States as have been agreed to be appropriate for the non-nuclear-weapon States in the non-proliferation Treaty. It is therefore clear that objections as to the means of verification are no longer valid as a reason for objecting to the cut-off.

90. The United States has given priority to a cut-off agreement for many years because it is a realistic measure that would limit once and for all the amount of nuclear materials available for weapons purposes, and that means it would limit the number of nuclear weapons because nuclear material is obviously an essential ingredient. This would be of clear benefit to nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike from the standpoint of their security, not to mention the benefits it would bring economically and as a confidence-building measure.

91. In conclusion, I should like to say that, while the issues before us are complex, we have had a most useful session. I believe we have laid the groundwork for more concrete achievements during the summer session.

92. I should like to express the thanks of the United States delegation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the valuable work they have done. I should also like to express our appreciation, and my personal appreciation, to the various officials, both seen and unseen, who are essential to the work of this Committee, particularly the interpreters who have carried out so well the difficult task of interpreting colloquial, ungrammatical and too-rapidly-spoken not-quite-English of this speaker into the other official languages of this Committee.

93. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament comes to the end of this session. Various proposals relating to the solution of disarmament questions have been submitted to the Committee, and numerous considerations have been put forward regarding what the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament could do in the first place in order to make progress towards achieving agreement on those questions. The main attention of the Committee has been devoted to problems relating to prohibition of the military use of the sea-bed, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and chemical and bacteriological weapons.

94. The question most widely discussed at the present session of the Committee was that of prohibiting the military use of the sea-bed. The discussion that took place has enabled us to draw the following conclusions. First of all, it should be noted that all delegations actively participated in the discussion and emphasized the need to implement effective measures to prevent the spread of the arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The broad understanding which emerged in the Committee of the importance of banning the use of the sea-bed for military purposes is a positive factor, which makes it possible to hope that our Committee will be able to elaborate for the achievement of that aim a concrete solution that meets the interests of strengthening international security and co-operation. Of course, such a solution can only be elaborated if all members of the Committee strive to seek constructive decisions.

95. We also note that the basis of the discussion that developed at this session was the draft treaty on prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof (ENDC/240) submitted by the Soviet delegation. A number of delegations expressed their support of the main principles underlying the Soviet draft treaty. In particular, wide support was given to the idea that the scope of the prohibition should be as large as possible, that the geographical area to be covered by the treaty should be as wide as possible and that the principles for defining its limits should not be linked to the existing limits of national jurisdiction. We regard the support given by many delegations to the main provisions of the Soviet draft treaty as another positive factor which opens up real prospects of achieving agreement on this question.

96. At the same time we cannot but point out that during the discussion considerable differences emerged in regard to the scope of the ban, which is the most important aspect of the future treaty. The representatives of the Western Powers, primarily those of the United States and the United Kingdom, oppose a complete ban on military activities

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on the sea-bed while showing a readiness to agree to prohibit only the emplacement there of weapons of mass destruction.

97. That position was reflected in the draft treaty on this subject submitted yesterday by the United States delegation (ENDC/249). The Soviet delegation is studying that draft and obviously, at the appropriate time, will express its views on the provisions contained therein. But I should like in a preliminary way to draw attention to the fact that many delegations have already pointed out that it is insufficient to restrict ourselves to a ban on the emplacement on the sea-bed of only weapons of mass destruction.

98. In adducing arguments in favour of their position, the representatives of the Western Powers allege that their proposal is the only realistic measure which can be implemented in order to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed. They state that a partial ban would facilitate the solution of problems of verification and would meet to a greater extent the interests of the security of coastal States. The position from which such arguments derive is an attempt to draw a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons and on that basis to prove the necessity of continuing certain types of military activity on the sea-bed.

99. We cannot agree that the legitimation of certain military activities on the sea-bed would not result in the development of an arms race there, whatever may be the arguments on which that view is based. The conclusion of an agreement banning only certain types of military activity on the sea-bed and the ocean floor would result in a situation where other kinds of activities not covered by this ban would be legitimized, and that would mean that the sea-bed and the ocean floor would become a new sphere of rivalry between States. Should only weapons of mass destruction be prohibited on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, as proposed by the delegation of the United States, there would still be the possibility of the development of a conventional arms race in that environment.

100. As to the attempts to draw a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, that distinction is very relative because the so-called defensive weapons can be used for aggressive purposes.

101. In summing up the discussion at the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee of a ban on the military use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, we should like to emphasize that in spite of the existing differences on certain aspects of this problem the aforementioned broad understanding of its importance is an encouraging factor which

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leads us to expect that during the forthcoming summer session of the Committee more persistent steps will be taken with a view to arriving at a constructive solution. If delegations show sufficient good-will in the search for mutually acceptable decisions, the Committee will be in a position to report to the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the positive results of our work in that field.

102. We should like to emphasize once again that the conclusion of a treaty banning the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor would contribute to a relaxation of international tension, would exclude vast areas of the globe from the sphere of the arms race and would create additional preconditions for the peaceful utilization of the sea-bed.

103. During the session considerable attention was given to questions of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet delegation considers that among those questions the one most ripe for solution is the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The implementation of that measure would outlaw nuclear weapons and would pave the way for further steps in the field of nuclear disarmament. The delegations of the socialist countries and those of a number of non-aligned States have expressed themselves at this session as being in favour of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

104. Thus, the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Christov, stated:

> "The Bulgarian Government has always warmly supported and continues to support the idea of concluding a convention to that end as quickly as possible. We consider that such a convention would have a vast repercussion on the international situation and would contribute to creating a favourable climate for all the discussions on disarmament." (ENDC/PV.406, para.38)

105. In dealing with the question of concluding a convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, the representative of India, Ambassador Husain, said:

> "India has always supported the idea of such a convention ... We do feel that, like other declaratory prohibitions in the past, such a convention could have a considerable moral and psychological value, and its conclusion need not await other agreements on nuclear disarmament." (ENDC/PV.404, para.64)

106. At the same time it should be pointed out that the Western States oppose the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In that connexion we should like to note that we have not yet received a reply from the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom to the question whether their own proposals put forward in 1957 (DC/113, annex 5) and 1962 (A/5174, annex II) still stand, proposals that nuclear weapons should not be used with aggressive intentions and that they should be used only

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for purposes of self-defence. Is this not an indication of the fact that the Western Powers are endeavouring to avoid a discussion of this question in our Committee?

107. Another problem of nuclear disarmament which was considered during the present session was that of the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union has for many years been advocating a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared its readiness to reach agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection and to conclude for that purpose a special international agreement.

108. The solution to the problem of outlawing all nuclear tests meets with the opposition of the Western Powers, which put forward the far-fetched pretext that international on-site inspections are necessary for control over the observance of an appropriate agreement. The demands for the carrying out of such inspections are shared neither by many members of our Committee nor by the scientists of a number of countries. That is also evidenced by the considerations put forward by the Swedish delegation at the present session on the question of banning underground nuclear tests. The Swedish delegation pointed out that the need to resort to inspection, by invitation, with a view to identifying an ambiguous seismic phenomenon may arise less than once in a decade (ENDC/PV.399, para.19). Such a statement of the question shows very convincingly that the demand for international inspection to verify a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests does not rest on solid ground. We are firmly convinced that for control over the observance of the cessation of nuclear tests no international inspection in any form is required.

109. The Swedish delegation introduced a working document which sets out the basic principles of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/242). The Soviet delegation has already noted the positive aspects of the Swedish draft and indicated (ENDC/PV.402, para.72) that the Soviet Union is prepared to exchange seismic information with other countries within the framework of the "detection club" proposed by Sweden (ENDC/154).

110. At the same time the Swedish working paper contains a number of provisions which cannot fail to give rise to objections. While recognizing the adequacy of seismic means of verifying an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, at the same time it includes, in point of fact, the principle of the carrying out of international on-site verification under the guise of inspection on invitation. There

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is no need for this provision since, as the Swedish delegation itself recognizes, national means of detection are adequate to reveal possible violations of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

111. One cannot fail to note also that in the Swedish working paper the question of carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is resolved in such a way that until a special agreement is concluded such explosions are excluded, whether undertaken for the nuclear countries themselves or on the basis of bilateral agreements -- which is contrary to the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*).

112. Unfortunately, we must observe that the negative position taken by the United States delegation in regard to any proposals for the prohibition of underground nuclear testing if they do not include a provision for compulsory on-site inspection hampers progress towards the solution of this problem. If the United States side continues to maintain this demand as an obligatory condition for the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests, all efforts by the members of the Committee to solve this problem will prove unavailing.

113. Among the problems raised during the present session the Soviet delegation regards the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons as important and urgent. Because of their capability to kill living organisms, chemical and biological weapons are amongst the most deadly means of mass destruction. The use of gases and poisonous substances compelled the nations to take measures to prevent their use in the future. As a result, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was elaborated. This agreement has been of great importance in preventing the use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. It has obtained wide international recognition. At present almost sixty States are parties to the Protocol.

114. In recent times the attention given by world public opinion to the problem of bacteriological and chemical weapons has increased considerably. This was reflected in General Assembly resolution 2162B (XXI) (ENDC/185) which, having defined chemical and bacteriological weapons as weapons of mass destruction, confirmed that these weapons "constitute a danger to all mankind and are incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization". The General Assembly called for "strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives" of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and condemned "all actions contrary to those objectives". The General Assembly invited all States to accede to the Protocol. The Soviet Union bases itself on the premise that the Geneva Protocol is an

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important international document which has played and is still playing a vital role in the fight against the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

115. Taking into account the threat presented by chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Soviet Government has suggested, as indicated in the memorandum of 1 July 1968 on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament (ENDC/227), that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should consider ways and means of securing the observance of the Geneva Protocol by all States.

116. The task of our Committee is to facilitate the accession to the Geneva Protocol of those States which so far have not acceded. This would contribute to solving the problem of excluding bacteriological and chemical weapons from the life of the community. The Soviet Union, basing itself on its position of principle on disarmament questions, advocates the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

117. In this connexion we should like to call the attention of the Committee to the statement by which Soviet scientists recently appealed to the scientists of all continents and countries. In their message they called for a struggle against the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and for the prohibition of their manufacture. They demanded the outlawing of these types of weapons.

118. In reviewing the discussion that has taken place at this session on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, we are gratified to note that virtually all delegations were in favour of ensuring the adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 of the largest possible number of States, and in favour of strengthening this Protocol. In this connexion we may refer to the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, who said on 25 March that: "The Eighteen-Nation Committee must outline how to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol by securing wider adherence to it." (ENDC/PV.397, para.99)

119. A different approach to this problem is proposed by the United Kingdom delegation. The United Kingdom position, as set forth in working paper ENDC/231, is based on the assumption that the Geneva Protocol is not a fully satisfactory document, and for its "improvement" it is proposed to separate the question of biological weapons from that of chemical weapons and to deal in the first place with the problem of biological weapons. As has been pointed out by many representatives, the separation of these questions would not lead to the strengthening but to the undermining of the Geneva

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Protocol and would not contribute to the solution of the tasks entrusted by the United Nations General Assembly to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

120. A positive factor of the present session is that a number of delegations, including those of Mexico, Sweden, Ethiopia, India, Brazil and Romania, have advocated more specific negotiations than have taken place recently on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet delegation is of the opinion that the existing world situation urgently imposes the need for a business-like discussion of this problem. The Soviet side has put forward proposals both for an all-round solution of the question of general and complete disarmament -- I have in mind the relevant Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1) -- and also for partial measures in the field of limiting the arms race and lessening international tension, as set forth in the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968. The Soviet Government, in putting forward the task of accomplishing individual partial measures, was guided by the fact that these should in the last analysis lead to general and complete disarmament.

121. In this connexion we still regard as an important task of the Committee the making of progress in the search for agreement on such questions as the elimination of foreign military bases, the prohibition of bomber aircraft flights with nuclear weapons aboard beyond national borders, regional disarmament measures, and so on.

122. One of the most urgent tasks is to ensure the speedy entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty. The Soviet delegation fully shares the endeavours of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to impart to that Treaty a universal character and thus contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. We deem it necessary to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that a few days ago the USSR Council of Ministers submitted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for ratification.

123. While taking specific steps for the ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty we should also like to observe that we share the concern of a number of delegations at the fact that some States which are close to manufacturing their own nuclear weapons have not so far signed this Treaty.

124. In endeavouring to make progress in solving disarmament questions it is necessary to recall that there are active forces in the world which are interested in the arms race. The building-up of military arsenals in quantity and quality is going on and the activities of the aggressive military blocs are being intensified. The Government of the Soviet Union and the governments of the other socialist countries have repeatedly

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

called attention to the danger inherent in a race in nuclear and other types of weapons and have put forward concrete proposals aimed at making mankind safe from the threat of a new war.

125. Now that we are interrupting for a brief period the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, we express the hope that this recess will be used by the States members of the Committee for the purpose of seeking constructive solutions which could be adopted by the Committee and reported to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet delegation will exert every effort to arrive as soon as possible at mutually acceptable solutions in regard to the questions that have been discussed in this Committee.

126. In conclusion the Soviet delegation would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, his Deputy, Mr. Epstein, and all the staff of the Secretariat, including the interpreters, for the highly skilled assistance which they have rendered to the Committee during the disarmament negotiations.

127. Mr. HUSAIN (India): At our meeting on 17 April my delegation welcomed the initiative taken by the Minister of State of Sweden in submitting for the consideration of the Committee possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/242) and I then expressed our general views about the basic principles involved (ENDC/PV.404, paras.61-63). Today I wish to comment on two aspects of a comprehensive nuclear test ban which have been the subject of much discussion among us recently.

128. The first concerns the question of intensifying co-operation for an international exchange of seismological data. While we do not believe that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban should await the perfectioning of seismic detection and identification techniques, my delegation welcomes the statements made by the representatives of the United States (Supra, para.84), the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.396, para.27) and the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.402, para.72) offering the co-operation of their respective countries in seismological data exchange. This is a significant step forward, and we for our part shall continue to lend our support, as we have already done in connexion with the deliberations of SIPRI. My delegation is of the firm view that the idea of seismological data exchange for detection purposes in an underground nuclear test ban treaty has come to stay, and we should like to place on record our appreciation of the initiative and the continuing efforts made in this regard by the Government of

(Mr. Husain, India)

Sweden. We have heard this morning the representative of Canada present some suggestions for an organized and effective world-wide exchange of seismological data. We warmly welcome that initiative and shall give the Canadian suggestions the most careful consideration in consultation with our experts.

129. The second aspect of a comprehensive test ban with which I propose to deal today concerns the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In my statement of 13 August 1968 I said:

> "... when we are legislating for the international community on a long-term basis some provision will have to be made for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That question is logically and directly linked to that of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It should be considered in conjunction with a comprehensive test ban and not separately from it." (ENDC/PV.389, para.15)

130. There are two equally important aspects of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. There is the economic aspect and there is also the disarmament aspect.

131. In the development of peaceful nuclear technology, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes occupy a very important place and might become, perhaps, the most significant instrument for the economic development of developing countries. There should be neither any monopoly nor any discrimination in regard to the development of the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We must avoid doing anything which might further widen the gulf between the rich and the poor nations or introduce a new and serious element of international friction and discontent.

132. The disarmament aspect of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes requires a complete stoppage of all nuclear explosions with a view to putting an end to the nuclear arms race. We in this Committee are at present engaged in specifically and directly dealing with that aspect. It has to be ensured that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are not misused in any manner for military purposes and that they do not contribute to a further aggravation of the nuclear arms race.

133. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was intended to be the first step in slowing down the nuclear arms race. However, it has been successful only to a limited extent, as not all nuclear-weapon States have yet become parties to it. Of no less significance for the continued intensification of the nuclear arms race has been the continued underground nuclear testing, although the international community has repeatedly called for an underground nuclear test ban. The discipline of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, to be meaningful, should therefore be total and absolute, and there

(Mr. Husain, India)

should be no loopholes in it. It will be effective only if the ban applies equally to all States, including all nuclear-weapon States, without exception.

134. To deal thereafter with the economic aspect which I mentioned earlier, a separate international agreement would need to be negotiated for regulating the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such an international agreement would of necessity have to cover several matters. For example, it would have to legislate the purposes for which explosions would be permitted and lay down the conditions under which they could be conducted. It would have to provide the necessary safeguards from the point of view of health and safety requirements. It would have to define the roles of various international agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organization. It may be pointed out that none of these aspects is dealt with in any existing international instrument, such as the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), nor indeed could one expect them to be provided for within the body of an underground nuclear test ban treaty.

135. Taken all together, these various matters would require a whole complex of rules and regulations laying down and governing an international regime of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is then clear that for the establishment of such a regime a separate, self-contained and comprehensive international agreement would be indispensable. In this connexion my delegation has noted with appreciation the views expressed by the representative of Brazil on 8 May (ENDC/PV.409, paras.10-12).

136. Several delegations have raised the question of the relationship of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty with article I, paragraph 3 of the Swedish draft of an underground nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/242). It may be recalled that article V of the non-proliferation Treaty seeks to ensure the availability not of existing but of "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" to non-nuclear-weapon States, and those potential benefits, as and when they become feasible, are to be made available through a special international agreement or agreements, or bilateral agreements, which would have to be negotiated and concluded in the future so as to provide for appropriate international observation and procedures. It will be seen, therefore, that article V of the non-proliferation Treaty is only an enabling provision, and no more than an enabling provision, for a specific and limited purpose. Similarly, article I, paragraph 3 of the Swedish draft constitutes an enabling provision by stating that explosions for peaceful purposes may be carried out "in conformity with an international agreement to be negotiated separately". That enabling provision of the

(Mr. Husain, India)

Swedish draft is also given support by a declaration of intent in the last preambular paragraph, which states that parties to the treaty intend "to conclude, at the earliest possible date, a separate international agreement regarding nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes". Thus, it is clear that the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has to be authorized under an independent international agreement to be negotiated and concluded separately. It is, further, clear that the international agreement contemplated in the Swedish draft is more basic in purpose and broader in scope than what is referred to in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, one cannot prejudge or prejudice the other.

137. In our discussions concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, apprehension has sometimes been expressed that if the conduct of such explosions were to be linked -- as in our view would be logical -- to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which might still take some time to achieve, would it not mean that there would be a certain hiatus or time-lag in the availability of potential benefits from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which have been provided for under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty? In answer, one might point out that all the possible benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes have not yet become imminent. We have heard several statements on that subject from the co-Chairmen, and one could reasonably hope that these benefits would in fact become available by the time a comprehensive test ban is achieved. One thing, however, is clear. There should be no piecemeal modification or whittling down of the partial test-ban Treaty to provide for peaceful nuclear explosions. The discipline of the partial test ban Treaty should be observed and such modifications as are necessary should be conceived of only as an integral part of a comprehensive international agreement on peaceful explosions, because on no account are we willing to accept a position under which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would in the years to come become the monopoly of nuclear-weapon Powers alone.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 415th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Afework Zelleke, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Canada, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and India.

"The delegation of Italy submitted a working paper containing additional suggestions on underground nuclear explosions (ENDC/250) following the Italian working paper (ENDC/234) of August 1968.

"The delegation of Canada submitted a working paper on the comprehensive test ban (ENDC/251).

"The delegation of the United States of America submitted a working paper on seismic investigation proposals (ENDC/252).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 July 1969, at 3.30 p.m."

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.416
3 July 1969
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 July 1969, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. M.A. HUSAIN (India)

GE.69-15113

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopia:	Mr. G. ALUIA
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Japan:	Mr. K. ASAKAI
	Mr. Y. NAKAYAMA
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
	Mr. J. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. J. SANZAR
	Mr. Z. ERDEDCO
	Mr. S. ADIKHOU
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Poland:	Mr. H. JAROSZEK
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. M. ECOBESCO
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
	Mr. F. ROSU
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. O. DAHLEN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. V.S. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. Y. RIZK

United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH

1. The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the 416th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before we begin our deliberations I should like to take this opportunity as Chairman of today's meeting -- and I hope that in this capacity I am expressing the sentiment of all the delegations present -- most warmly and heartily to welcome to our midst the delegations of Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic. I have no doubt that in their participation as members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament they will make a most valuable contribution to our work, thereby helping to strengthen and to promote further the cause of peace in the world.

3. I now call upon the leader of the Japanese delegation.

4. Mr. ASAKAI (Japan): I should like first of all to express my profound gratitude to the Chairman of the day, Ambassador Husain of India, who has extended such a warm welcome to us on behalf of all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

5. On this occasion I should like, with the indulgence of the Committee, to read out a message dated 3 July 1969 from the Prime Minister of Japan to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The message reads:

"On behalf of the Japanese Government and people, I should like to send my most cordial greetings to the Disarmament Committee.

"In the world today, which is filled with persistent tensions and confrontations, the most urgent task facing all of us is to make every effort for the realization of a peaceful society free from the fear of war.

"Since disarmament must be an integral part of any such effort, the people of the world have been constantly watching, with keen interest and expectation, the discussions on disarmament problems held by the Committee over the last several years.

"Meanwhile the Japanese Government and people, as a result of their experience in the past, have never ceased to desire the elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of an international society free from war, and have upheld the Constitution, which is without parallel in the history of the world, renouncing war as a sovereign right of the nation.

"The Japanese Government and people, who have so long endeavoured to further the cause of disarmament, are most happy that Japan's admission to the Disarmament Committee has now been realized and that the Japanese delegation is today participating in the work of the Committee.

(Mr. Asakai, Japan)

"Since the problem of disarmament today involves a number of complicated and many-sided factors, it is extremely difficult for us to find a solution to it even with the most persistent effort. To achieve the final goal of general and complete disarmament we must strive steadily to find one solution after another of whatever issues can be agreed on through the wisdom and perseverance of all nations.

"It is my earnest hope that my country will make a substantial contribution to the work of the Committee; and I also wish to state that the Japanese Government intends to strive toward that end, working in close co-operation with all the other governments represented on the Committee."

6. The CHAIRMAN (India): I call now upon the leader of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic.

7. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): First of all, on behalf of its Government the Mongolian delegation wishes to express to the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament deep gratitude for having recommended it as an additional member of this eminent international body, the very name of which expresses its lofty aims. We should also like to express our thanks to the Chairman of today's meeting, the representative of India, for his warm congratulations and good wishes to our delegation and his kind words about my country.

8. It is indeed a great honour for my delegation to serve on this Committee, an important international instrument called upon to co-ordinate and elaborate measures on disarmament in the interests of ensuring universal peace and security and strengthening confidence among nations. We are fully aware of the high responsibility which membership of this important organ has placed on us. We also understand full well that we shall have to share, too, the tremendous duty which this Committee is bound to have towards mankind.

9. It is in this spirit that I wish to assure you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee that the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic will spare no efforts in order to contribute to the successful work of the Committee dedicated to the realization of the cherished desire of mankind, general and complete disarmament. In our efforts towards this goal my delegation will be inspired by and will draw confidence from the principles of the genuinely peaceful foreign policy of its Government, which is gaining ever more international recognition. Our presence here in this enlarged Committee on Disarmament is a testimony to that fact. At the same time my delegation

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

places great hopes in the kind co-operation of the members of this Committee, whose rich experience will be for us an important source of encouragement and successful work.

10. The Mongolian People's Republic, together with the socialist countries and other peace-loving States, is consistently pursuing a foreign policy directed at ensuring universal peace and security and strengthening peaceful co-operation among nations. This policy stems from the very socio-political essence of our socialist society; and that lends a great moral weight to our foreign policy.

11. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic considers the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control to be a cardinal issue of the day. Our Government has consistently supported all the measures and constructive steps promoting the cessation of the arms race and removing the threat of a world thermonuclear war.

12. That is borne out by the fact that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic was among the first to sign and ratify the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) (Annex)), as well as the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)(Annex), ENDC/226*), which can pave the way for subsequent positive steps in the field of nuclear disarmament.

13. So the Mongolian delegation states here with satisfaction that our small country joins this Committee with fairly impressive assets of positive acts in support of the Committee's efforts.

14. The statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic on 2 June 1969 in connexion with the inclusion of the Mongolian People's Republic in the enlarged Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, stresses that -

> "... The Mongolian People's Republic, as a member of the Committee on Disarmament, as a socialist State, will spare no efforts in order to contribute its share to the achievement of effective results in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament and to the cause of securing and strengthening peace throughout the world."

15. My delegation hopes that it will have further opportunities of stating the position of its Government on the matters which are before the Committee.

16. The CHAIRMAN (India): With that statement the open part of this meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is concluded, and I would request the Press to withdraw.

The meeting was suspended at 2.45 p.m. and resumed at 3.50 p.m.

17. The CHAIRMAN (India): Now that we are beginning our closed meeting I should like to welcome warmly Ambassador Leonard, who has joined us for the resumption of this session. We heartily welcome him and are sure that with his assistance our deliberations will proceed well and successfully.

18. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): We are very happy to resume our work here in Geneva, and we are grateful for the hospitality of the United Nations in making these facilities available to us.

19. We also appreciate that once again this Committee will have the benefit of the assistance and counsel of our distinguished colleague and friend who represents the Secretary-General, Dr. Protitch, as well as of his staff from the United Nations.

20. I should like to join in welcoming the new participants in this Committee. We are very pleased that Japanese and Mongolian representatives will now join in the Committee's work; and the message we have just heard from Prime Minister Sato provides us with evidence that our Japanese colleagues will indeed make a significant contribution to the work of this Committee in carrying out its important tasks.

21. Before passing to the substantive part of my remarks I should like to make just a few personal comments. It is an honour to be present among you today; and I am most grateful to our Chairman of today, Ambassador Husain, for his kind remarks directed to me. This Committee is clearly the most successful, and for this reason the most esteemed, of all disarmament committees that have existed. It has achieved this pre-eminence not by luck but because so many capable and dedicated men have worked over the years to achieve concrete results. This has been true of those who have sat at this table in the past, and it is true of those who are here today. All of the members of this Committee may be confident that I and the other members of the United States delegation will do our best to contribute to the continuing achievements of this Committee; and I shall certainly do everything I can to maintain the traditions established by my illustrious predecessors on the American delegation.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

22. The President of the United States has asked that I convey to this Committee a message containing his thoughts about the Committee's work. I should like now to read that message and to ask that it be made a Conference document[1]:

"I have followed closely the activities of the Spring session of the Disarmament Committee, and Ambassador Smith has reported to me on the prospects for progress in the near future.

"As the Conference resumes its work after a recess of six weeks, I would like to address the following thoughts to the members of the Committee:

"First, the ground has been prepared for concrete arms control negotiations. In addition to the valuable suggestions by many members of the Committee, draft agreements have been submitted by the United States[2] and by the Soviet Union[3] to prevent an arms race on the sea-beds. Although differences exist, it should not prove beyond our ability to find common ground so that a realistic agreement may be achieved that enhances the security of all countries.

"The framing of an international agreement to apply to more than 100 million square miles of the earth's surface lying under the oceans is a high challenge to our vision and our statesmanship. I ask the participants in this Committee to join with us in elaborating a measure that is both practical and significant. With good will on all sides and a fair measure of hard work, we may achieve agreement in the course of this session. With each passing day the sea-bed becomes more important for the security and well-being of all nations. Our goal should be to present a sound sea-bed arms control measure to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"Second, the Secretary-General of the United Nations is issuing a study[4] on the effects of chemical and biological warfare. Experts from many countries have contributed to this important work. I am pleased that an expert from the United States, Dr. Ivan Bennett, has also played a role in the study. We welcome the Secretary-General's study, since it will draw the attention of all mankind to an area of common concern.

1/ ENDC/253.

2/ ENDC/249.

3/ ENDC/240.

4/ A/7575.

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

"The delegation of the United States is prepared to examine carefully, together with other delegations, any approaches that offer the prospect of reliable arms control in this field.

"Third, in my letter to Ambassador Smith on 18 March[5/] at the opening of the first session of this Committee, I reaffirmed United States support for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified; I stated my conviction that efforts must be made toward greater understanding of the verification issue. I am pleased that, during your first session, serious exploration of verification problems took place. The United States delegation will be prepared to continue to participate in efforts towards greater understanding of this key issue. It is only by means of careful study, with due regard for all of the relevant technical and political considerations, that progress can be made.

"Fourth, I recently announced that the United States hopes to be able to commence talks with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations around 31 July or shortly thereafter. When these talks begin, which I hope and trust will be soon, they will of necessity be bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States Government is, however, deeply conscious of its responsibilities to its allies and to the community of nations.

"While these talks progress, it is particularly important that multilateral negotiations continue in this Committee in an atmosphere of determination and promise. Arms control is without dispute a subject of direct concern to all nations, large and small. The wisdom, the advice, and the informed concern of many nations are needed in a continuing body such as this to ensure that no opportunities are missed to achieve genuine progress.

"This Committee clearly is the world's pre-eminent multilateral disarmament forum. Its record of accomplishment, which needs no recital here, is greater than that of any other disarmament committee in history. I trust that your Committee will continue its efforts with all of the combined skill and dedication which its members have demonstrated in the past.

"The negotiation of sound arms control and disarmament, like all work contributing to peace, must be an integrated and comprehensive effort. Progress

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5/ ENDC/239*

(Mr. Leonard, United States)

in the tasks of your Committee will be a contribution to a world of peaceful international cooperation, a world where fear and conflict are supplanted by the honest give-and-take of negotiation aimed at meeting the legitimate aspirations of all.

"The United States will work in every way to bring us closer to such a world."

23. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today the Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work. We are beginning the negotiations at the present session with a broader composition than before. To the participants in the Committee there have been added two States -- the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan. In this connexion allow me, on behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf, to welcome among us the distinguished representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Dugersuren, and the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Asakai, and to wish them every success in the course of solving disarmament problems. We express the hope that the participation of the delegations of the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan in the work of the Committee will contribute to the fulfilment of the important and responsible tasks facing our Conference.

24. It is well known that the Mongolian People's Republic, consistently pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, is making a substantial contribution to the cause of disarmament and the easing of international tension. It has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*), actively supports all constructive proposals aimed at solving urgent disarmament problems, and has itself more than once taken a valuable initiative with the object of contributing towards ending the arms race and ensuring international security. In the statement which the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Dugersuren, made today at the open meeting of the Committee, he reaffirmed the determination and endeavour of his country to do everything possible to ensure progress in achieving agreement on the disarmament questions that are ripe for solution, and to contribute to the success of our work.

25. We are also aware of the great interest shown in the problems of disarmament by Japan, a country which is playing an important role in international affairs. We are gratified to note in the statement made by the representative of Japan, Ambassador Asakai,

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

at today's open meeting and in the message from the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Sato, which he read out to us, the intention of his country to contribute to the achievement of agreements on the questions with which our Committee on Disarmament is to deal.

26. Allow me also to welcome the newly-appointed head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Leonard, and to wish him success in carrying out the functions of head of his country's delegation and co-Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. We also welcome the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and his colleagues, who carry out the very important function of assisting our Committee in its work.

27. Today, when the Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work, we are faced once again with a wide range of important and crucial problems awaiting solution. In present-day conditions, when the arms race is increasing its momentum and international tension continues unabated, it is particularly important that at the present session our Conference should make a good start in its work and move forward in solving the questions facing it. The adoption of measures designed to avert the threat of nuclear war and put a stop to the dangerous arms race in all spheres has been and continues to be the main task which our Committee on Disarmament is called upon to carry out.

28. As in the past, the Soviet Union intends to exert every effort to achieve the speediest possible solution of urgent disarmament questions. When we speak in favour of solving disarmament questions, we start from the premise that today a stable peace is not a utopia but a fully attainable goal. There exist in the world today powerful social and political forces which oppose war and are in favour of lessening tension and broadening international cooperation. The action of these forces obviates the inevitability of a new world war and creates a genuine possibility of realizing the aspirations of the peoples for peace. The conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons show that, when the proper efforts are made, concrete results can be achieved in the cause of disarmament and of preserving and consolidating peace.

29. During the session of the Committee on Disarmament last spring a number of important questions were considered. The attention of the Committee was devoted primarily to the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes, the discontinuance of underground nuclear weapon tests, the prohibition of

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

the use of such weapons and the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The consideration of those problems was not completed. It did not lead to the elaboration of agreed documents. It is our task to continue the consideration of those and of other disarmament questions with a view to the preparation by the Committee of appropriate draft agreements for submission to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

30. As regards individual disarmament problems among the aforementioned ones considered at the previous session of the Committee, it must be noted that considerable attention was devoted to preventing the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes. At the beginning of the last session of the Committee the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty providing for the prohibition of all military activities on the sea-bed (ENDC/240). This solution of the problem of military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor was supported by many members of the Committee. Nevertheless, the United States and the other Western Powers participating in the Committee's work did not agree to the prohibition of all military activities in that environment. At the end of the Committee's session the United States submitted a draft treaty (ENDC/249) with a view to a partial solution of this problem, namely the prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed and the ocean floor of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Soviet delegation believes that that partial solution of the problem is inadequate because it cannot ensure a definitive and complete solution of the problem of preventing the arms race spreading to the sea-bed and the ocean floor. We are convinced that it would be much more effective to adopt a different approach which would ensure a radical solution of this problem, namely complete demilitarization of the sea-bed.

31. Many representatives stressed in their statements the need to undertake effective measures in this field before the arms race gets fully under way in this sphere of human activity which is only now being opened up. It behoves our Committee to carry out this task. In elaborating a draft treaty on the sea-bed, a number of important questions requiring agreement arise, namely: the scope of the prohibition, the definition of the geographical area covered by the treaty, the establishment of a

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system of control over compliance by States with the provisions of the treaty, and so on. We express the hope that the solution of these questions will not encounter insuperable difficulties and that a draft treaty to prevent the use of the sea-bed for military purposes will be elaborated at the present session of the Committee and then submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The conclusion of such a treaty would have a positive influence on the solution of other disarmament problems and would contribute to improving the international situation as a whole.

32. There is no doubt that the most important problem in the field of disarmament continues to be that of solving nuclear disarmament questions, including the discontinuance of underground nuclear weapon tests and the prohibition of the use of such weapons. We should like to emphasize once again that the question of the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests is ripe for solution both at the political level and from the point of view of the technical feasibility of control over such a ban by national means of detection and identification. Basing ourselves on this position, we are prepared, as before, to agree to the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests. We should like to hope that the Western Powers will be able to reconsider their demand for international inspections in order to exercise control over the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

33. A considerable part of the discussion at the previous session of the Committee was taken up by the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. In regard to this problem, however, the Western Powers -- the United States and the United Kingdom -- spoke from negative positions, which do not allow any progress to be made towards the solution of this question. The task consists of once again exploring all possibilities and exerting efforts for the speediest possible solution of these important questions relating to nuclear disarmament. It would be wrong to confine ourselves to noting the divergencies in the positions of States on the aforesaid questions and to abandon any further search for their solution.

34. Alongside the aforementioned questions the Committee also considered the problem of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, including the prohibition of their production and stockpiling, and their withdrawal from the arsenals of States.

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So long as nuclear weapons exist, their prohibition and elimination will remain invariably the most important problem in the field of disarmament. Closely linked with the solution of this problem is the development of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, which opens up before mankind wide prospects of technical and economic progress. Taking into account the importance of this problem, the Soviet Government proposed in its Memorandum of 1 July 1968 (ENDC/227) that all the nuclear Powers should initiate immediately negotiations on the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stockpiles and the subsequent complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control.

35. At its spring session the Committee also discussed the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, a question which attracted considerable attention on the part of the members of the Committee. Indeed, this is understandable. Chemical and bacteriological weapons have a tremendous lethal power and are a means of mass destruction of people. Our task is to ban these weapons altogether and to eliminate them from the military arsenals of States. A first step along this path should be the greatest possible reinforcement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. This reinforcement is to be achieved first of all through accession to the Protocol -- which reflects an important standard of international law and played a positive role during the Second World War -- by those States which so far are not parties to this Protocol.

36. The Committee on Disarmament must continue to explore the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, bearing in mind the need to obtain the fullest possible solution of this problem. We hope that the Secretary-General's report (A/7575) on the effects of the use of these types of weapon, prepared under General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) (ENDC/237), will facilitate progress in this direction.

37. The Committee also considered other problems of disarmament. Many delegations devoted considerable attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament. Our delegation expressed its views on this important problem, basing itself on the urgency of a solution. We hope that the present session of the Committee will continue to discuss the problem of general and complete disarmament with a view to

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giving the negotiations on this question more concrete forms which would help progress to be made in solving it. We also hope that progress in elaborating and agreeing upon partial measures of disarmament will create favourable opportunities for the solution of wider disarmament problems.

38. That, briefly, is the situation in the Committee as regards the consideration of disarmament questions. It is not our task to make a generalized assessment of this situation. Nevertheless, we share the opinion expressed at the last session by a number of representatives to the effect that the consideration in the Committee of disarmament problems and agreement upon them are not sufficiently intensive. It is necessary to activate the negotiations in every possible way and to exert greater efforts in order to agree upon concrete steps in the field of disarmament.

39. We consider that at the present moment, in order to preserve peace and ensure success in the disarmament negotiations, it is a matter of urgency to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to implement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In advocating the ratification of that Treaty, we regard it as a link in the chain of measures intended to lead to nuclear disarmament. The fact that a number of States which are getting very close to producing nuclear weapons still avoid acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty creates certain difficulties for further progress towards disarmament. In this particular case we have in mind, first and foremost, the Federal Republic of Germany, where there are very influential forces which are striving to obtain access to nuclear weapons and endeavouring to frustrate the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

40. When considering concrete questions relating to disarmament, we must at the same time devote particular attention to the problem of the implementation of the international agreements already agreed upon in the Committee. If a situation should come about where international agreements on disarmament, after having been approved by a wide range of States, were blocked by the forces which oppose disarmament, the effectiveness of disarmament negotiations both within the Committee and outside it would be called into question. Such a situation, of course, cannot be allowed.

41. In concluding our statement today, we should like to stress also the fact that we shall have to submit to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the

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United Nations a report on the work accomplished. It is quite obvious that concrete results are expected from the Committee. That enhances the importance of the current session of the Committee and lays a great responsibility upon us. The Soviet delegation will do its utmost in order that our discussion may be carried on in a constructive spirit and lead to the positive results which are vitally necessary for the strengthening of international peace and security.

42. Mr. CASTANEDA (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): On the express instructions of my Government, I should like first of all to extend a very warm welcome to the delegations of Japan and Mongolia, which are present for the first time at a meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We have always believed -- and we have said so from the outset -- that States like those which these delegations represent could make a valuable contribution to the accomplishment of the tasks which the United Nations General Assembly has entrusted to us since 1961 and which it insistently repeats to us each year in its resolutions.

43. We consider it essential, however, to place on record the position of principle which the Government of Mexico has upheld, and continues to uphold, in regard to the enlargement of the Committee. This is all the more necessary because up to now there has been nothing in the documents of the Committee to explain the presence among us of the aforesaid delegations. Consequently my delegation will now proceed to read out the full text of the statement which the co-Chairmen circulated to the other members of the Committee on 23 May:

(spoke in English)

"The co-Chairmen of the ENDC have been in consultation for some time about the composition of this Committee, Our aim is to promote further the use of this Committee as an instrument to pursue the relaxation of international tensions and to negotiate disarmament measures, ending ultimately in an agreement on general and complete disarmament, in accordance with the report of the United States and the Soviet Union to the sixteenth General Assembly on the results of bilateral talks -- Agreed Statement of Principles of 21 September 1961.[6]

6/ (ENDC/5)

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

"The choice of additional candidate countries has been most difficult for both co-Chairmen. Many countries desire and deserve to be included in this Committee, but it has been found impossible to reach agreement on a co-Chairmen's recommendation before the close of this session which would preserve the balance of the Committee when it was established in 1961.

"The co-Chairmen, at this stage, have agreed on two countries, Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic, which they could jointly recommend as additional members of the Committee.

"The co-Chairmen also agree that the enlargement of the Committee cannot be confined to these two countries. Various other regions of the world should be represented, to give the enlargement geographic and political balance.

"The co-Chairmen will continue their efforts to reach agreement urgently on these other countries during the recess.

"The co-Chairmen would like the views of the Committee on whether it would be appropriate to invite Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic to participate in the summer session, scheduled to start 3 July 1969."

(continued in Spanish)

44. We should also like to have included in the record of our meeting today the full text of the memorandum of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, dated 2 June, which was transmitted by the delegation of my country to the co-Chairmen on 15 June, in response to the request made by the co-Chairmen themselves in the last paragraph of their statement which I have just read out. That memorandum was worded as follows:

"The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Mexico has given careful study to the joint statement of the co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament which was put before the Committee at its informal meeting on 23 May last and, in response to the request made by the authors of that statement, has pleasure in setting forth below the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the subject:

1. The Government of Mexico has no objection to the composition of the Committee being enlarged to include Japan and Mongolia, since it believes that both States, and more particularly the former, which is the only State whose own people have suffered the terrible effects of nuclear weapons, will be able to make a valuable contribution to the Committee's work.

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

2. The Government of Mexico considers, however, that inclusion of these States in the Committee should not take effect until:

(a) the co-Chairmen have reached agreement, in consultation with the representatives of the eight non-aligned States members of the Committee, to suggest the simultaneous addition of two other States belonging to this category, in order to preserve the balance which at present exists in the Committee and which has proved very advantageous for its work;

(b) the United Nations General Assembly has been informed and has had an opportunity to endorse the agreement reached by the co-Chairmen concerning the enlargement in question, as it did in 1961 by means of resolution 1722 (XVI), in which the members which at present compose the Committee are specifically mentioned. This procedure appears to be essential in the light also of the provisions of resolution 1660 (XVI), which was also adopted in 1961 and which constitutes the immediate antecedent to the establishment of this Committee. In that resolution, as will be recalled, the General Assembly both urged the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement 'on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world can regard as satisfactory', and requested the two Governments to report 'to the General Assembly, before the conclusion of its sixteenth session, on the results of such negotiations'."

45. The Government of Mexico agrees that the function of the two co-Chairmen is absolutely essential for the smooth running of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; but at the same time it takes the view that, as far as the admission of new members to the Committee is concerned, their function should be confined to making recommendations to the General Assembly. In its resolution 1660 (XVI) the General Assembly expressed "the hope that such negotiations" -- that is, those to take place between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time on the composition of the Committee -- "will be started without delay and will lead to an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly". I emphasize the word "recommendation". The recommendation, by its very nature, has to be made before admission by the Assembly. Making a recommendation is not equivalent to an a posteriori report that the Committee has been enlarged in one way or another. We believe that, although there are differences between the present situation and that which prevailed in 1961, basically the procedure for establishing or enlarging the Committee is the same.

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46. Having said that, I repeat my very warm welcome to the representatives of Japan and Mongolia.

47. Lastly, I am happy to inform the Committee that the preliminary meeting for the establishment of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America under the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186) was held in Mexico from 24 to 28 June. The number of signatory States required in order to set up the Agency was eleven. So far thirteen States have adhered. At that meeting eight basic documents for putting the Agency into operation were approved. These were the draft rules of procedure of the General Conference, the draft agreement between the Headquarters State and the Agency, a draft agreement on privileges and immunities, draft staff regulations, the draft budget, draft financial regulations, a draft of the scale of contributions and a draft of the establishment of a working fund.

48. On 2 September the first session of the General Conference of the new Agency will be held. Besides considering and possibly approving the eight preparatory documents I have mentioned, the General Conference will examine, among other items on its agenda, the implementation of article 13 of the Treaty relating to bilateral safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Another item of some importance on the agenda of the First General Conference of interest to our Committee is the one entitled "Status of the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): Report of the Depositary Government".

49. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, sent a message to the preparatory meeting expressing the hope that by the time the General Conference convenes in September there will have been further signatures and ratifications of the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty which deals with the guarantees of the nuclear Powers.

50. Mr. ASAKAI (Japan): I should like first to reiterate my gratitude to the representatives who have preceded me for welcoming my country to this Committee.

51. Taking advantage of the occasion of my country's admission to this important Committee, I should like with your indulgence to explain at some length the attitude of the Japanese Government on the question of disarmament as a whole, as well as my country's fundamental positions on several problems in this field.

(Mr. Asakai, Japan)

52. The aim of any State's policy is to promote the well-being of its people, and the achievement of that well-being can only be realized in a society free from war. Again, the greatest responsibility of all of us living in the world of today is to ensure that our descendants shall inherit a peaceful and prosperous world.

53. Even today, when the curtain has risen on the space age, various kinds of confrontations and hostile feelings caused by such factors as differences in ideology, religion, political system, and so on, continue to exist; and those confrontations and hostile feelings are becoming increasingly more dangerous than in the past with the appearance of nuclear weapons possessing the power of immense destruction.

54. Despite all these situations, the human race has indeed been fortunate in having been successful in avoiding the outbreak in some way or other of a war on a world-wide scale. While this has doubtless been due in large measure to the existence of a balance of power in the deterrents of the super-Powers, it should not be ignored that forums for discussions relating to disarmament have existed almost constantly since the Second World War, providing the super-Powers with a suitable place for a dialogue between themselves, thus helping greatly to avoid a major war. Again, we cannot overlook the fact that all the other members of this Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, established seven years ago, have greatly aided the co-operation between the super-Powers. In other words, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not only carried on discussions but has also contributed to the maintenance of world peace through those discussions. A peace preserved only by the balance of power, however, can never be satisfactory, since we shall still be constantly menaced by the danger that such a precarious situation would be easily destroyed by the collapse of the balance. Accordingly, our ideal and ultimate goal must be to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a gradual scaling-down of the size of the countries' deterrents while carefully maintaining the balance of deterrence that exists between the super-Powers.

55. More than twenty years have already elapsed since Japan suffered a tremendous catastrophe caused by nuclear weapons. It is their experience of the suffering caused by such weapons that has made so strong the desire of the Japanese people to eliminate nuclear weapons completely. The people of my country, after having had this experience, established their Constitution -- the like of which cannot be found in the history of the world -- in which they state their resolve to renounce war as

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a sovereign right of the nation, and they have firmly upheld this Constitution ever since. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states:

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes."

56. The Japanese Government also passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955, when atomic energy was just beginning to be used for peaceful purposes in Japan, and stated clearly the principle that the research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the Japanese Government is strictly adhering to the policy of not producing, not possessing and not bringing in nuclear weapons.

57. The reason why the Japanese Government is maintaining the policy I have just mentioned, of renouncing war and not possessing nuclear weapons, is the earnest wish of the Japanese people that nuclear weapons should be eliminated from the earth and that an international society free from the threat of war should be realized. Against the background of this earnest wish of the people of my country, the Japanese Government has been appealing to the world for the promotion of disarmament on every available occasion, including such occasions as the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly.

58. My country has also been co-operating for the last three years with other countries in an effort to find a solution to the problem of verification for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. Furthermore, scientists from my country have participated in the preparation of the United Nations Secretary-General's reports on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons (A/6858) and of chemical and bacteriological weapons (A/7575). In this way my country has already been taking an active part in the work for disarmament; and we reiterate our determination that Japan shall continue to contribute to the maintenance of world peace through the promotion of disarmament by participating in the work of this Disarmament Committee, which is the principal form for the discussion of the question of disarmament.

59. The opening paragraph of the Charter of the United Nations manifests the determination of the peoples of the Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The Japanese people also, in the preamble to their Constitution, state:

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"We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time ... We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want."

Such an ideal society enjoying peace "for all time" cannot be realized unless the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations are strengthened to such an extent that each nation will be able to give up its own armaments and to rely entirely for its security upon the United Nations collective security system. Needless to say, the society in which we are living at present is far from one in which general and complete disarmament could be realized at a single stroke.

60. As we are all aware, the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted their respective drafts of a treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30 and Add. 1-3; ENDC/2/Rev.1) to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; but since then negotiations on this question have been at a standstill. One of the reasons for this stagnation is that not all the nuclear Powers have been participating in the discussions on disarmament. The partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) concluded in 1963 is still limited in its effectiveness because of the non-adherence to it of some nuclear Powers. How can we hope for the realization of general and complete disarmament without the participation of all the nuclear Powers? We earnestly hope, therefore, that those nuclear Powers which have not been participating in the international discussions on disarmament will do so as soon as possible.

61. On the other hand, it is my delegation's opinion that in order to achieve general and complete disarmament we must work towards it by the steady accumulation and successful implementation of whatever collateral measures can be agreed upon meanwhile. For this reason we welcome the accumulation of such collateral measures as the partial test-ban Treaty, the Treaty on Antarctica (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, p.71 et seq.) the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). We esteem particularly highly the efforts of this Committee to conclude the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

62. However, in promoting collateral measures we must always take into account the fact that they must be such as will help to maintain and strengthen world peace at each stage. In this connexion we attach special importance to point 5 of the principles for general and complete disarmament agreed on between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961, which states:

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"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2)

63. The priority of nuclear disarmament over other questions of disarmament has already been confirmed by last year's session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; and we also entirely support that opinion. We believe that the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to proceed to a considerable extent with nuclear disarmament without causing an unfavourable balance in relation to other nuclear-weapon States; since in the field of nuclear armament, unlike the position in the field of conventional armaments, both the United States and the Soviet Union enjoy outstanding superiority over other States.

64. In discussing nuclear disarmament it is necessary to take into consideration the questions both of quality and of quantity. The nuclear weapons which already exist include weapons ranging from megaton nuclear weapons capable of destroying at one stroke a huge city with a population of several millions to tactical nuclear weapons with low kiloton yields which can be used in the field; and research and development work to increase their efficiency is still continuing. The best way to check this qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons is simply to prohibit nuclear weapon tests.

65. In spite of the fact that the existing volume of nuclear weapons is said to be more than enough to annihilate the whole human race, stockpiles of nuclear weapons are still growing. The most effective way to curb the increase in the quantity of nuclear weapons is to halt the production of fissionable nuclear materials for the production of nuclear weapons and to transfer the existing stockpiles of these materials to use for peaceful purposes. Because the objective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is limited to the checking of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, we must now make every effort to curb the vertical proliferation of these weapons through the realization of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of production of fissionable nuclear materials for military use, and the transfer of the stockpiles of these materials to use for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Asakai, Japan)

66. Although the partial test-ban Treaty was concluded in 1963, we have not yet achieved the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, which is the only field not covered by that Treaty. The most difficult technical problem in formulating a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests is that of verification to ensure compliance with the treaty. In recent years, however, great advances have been made in research and international co-operation relating to the detection and identification of underground nuclear-weapon tests by seismological methods.

67. The study meetings on seismic methods of monitoring underground explosions which took place last year in Stockholm under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm and with the participation of experts from ten countries, including four nuclear-weapon States, reached the conclusion that, as far as underground disturbances of a magnitude greater than 4.75 are concerned, discrimination between nuclear explosions and earthquakes would be possible with almost 100 per cent accuracy from outside the country in which the disturbances took place (ENDC/230). This is a fact which marks a new epoch in the negotiations aimed at prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests. We should make every effort to improve teleseismic observation techniques to the point where we can with certainty identify all underground explosions.

68. At the same time short-range observation must also be recognized as deserving intensive study so that we may find a solution to the problem of identifying such disturbances as cannot yet be identified by teleseismic observation. One of the possible methods of making such short-range observation effective would be for each nuclear-weapon State to be permitted on a reciprocal basis to install unmanned seismological observatories — the so-called black boxes -- in appropriate places within the territory of other nuclear-weapon States with a view to monitoring underground explosions.

69. But in the last analysis the most effective method is the one by which the data from seismological observatories in each country would be internationally exchanged and examined. In this case, however, little would be gained unless the data which were so exchanged covered all the important areas. Accordingly it is necessary for us first of all to know how wide is the monitoring range of existing seismological

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observatories. If there were areas which the existing seismological observatories could not cover, we would hope that each country would install seismological observatories in appropriate places within its own territory. We believe that by taking the steps I have just mentioned we would be able to make a further step towards the solution of verification problems. Since Japan, owing to its geographical location, is able to supply valuable observation data, we shall be able to contribute to the discrimination of seismic data.

70. The halting of the production of fissionable materials for weapons use and the transfer of the stockpiles of those materials to peaceful purposes are fundamental steps towards the reduction of nuclear weapons and are included in the proposals for general and complete disarmament of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The question of verification has been the biggest obstacle to the preparation of a treaty for this purpose; but a system of safeguards similar to that which is to be applied to non-nuclear-weapon States by the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must also be applicable as a verification measure in this case. Accordingly we hope that the negotiations to halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes will not be further delayed on the pretext that the problem of verification is insoluble.

71. At the same time we also hope that the proposal that all nuclear-weapon States should bring their nuclear weapons to designated depots for disassembly, for removal of fissionable materials, and for destruction of the remaining components in a manner that would be demonstrated to nationals of all States, may be re-examined. Such proof of destruction of the components of nuclear weapons would certainly make all the peoples of the world understand the significance of article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in which each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

72. Needless to say, the freezing and the reduction of stockpiles of means of delivering nuclear weapons are closely related to nuclear disarmament. It is welcome news that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the control of strategic missiles are expected in the very near future. As has been

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pointed out by many representatives to this Disarmament Committee in the past, if a system of ballistic missile defence were once deployed, a means of penetrating that system would soon be developed, thus making inevitable a nuclear arms race which would form a vicious circle, reaching a point of no return. In addition to this, the deployment of such weapons as might enhance the temptation to strike first would destroy the balance of deterrence, thus damaging the present stability. Because the development of such new weapons systems is proceeding with astonishing speed, we sincerely hope that negotiations will be started for the cessation of the strategic arms race before the problem becomes too difficult for us even to seek a solution to it.

73. Such negotiations will probably take a considerable time. We hope, therefore, that both the United States and the Soviet Union will make every effort to reach an agreement, step by step, beginning their negotiations with such questions as might be easiest of solution. If the negotiations between the two countries relating to the control of missiles should fail to achieve any meaningful results, future discussions in this Committee, particularly on the question of concluding a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear-weapons tests, would be adversely affected. If, on the other hand, some agreement should be reached by the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of controlling missiles, it is surely to be expected that the chances of fruitful discussions in the Disarmament Committee would be greatly enhanced.

74. A thorough examination must also be made for the purpose of prohibiting chemical and biological weapons, since these weapons are, together with nuclear weapons, capable of being employed for the purpose of mass destruction. It was a most timely and appropriate step towards the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons that an expert group on chemical and bacteriological weapons appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with last year's United Nations General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) (ENDC/237) completed the report on their study of the effects of the possible use of such weapons.

75. As far as concerns the prohibition of the use of poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons, we already have the Geneva Protocol of 1925. However, as scientific developments since then have made it possible to produce weapons which are not covered by that Protocol, it is imperative that we should supplement the Protocol. Furthermore, in order to eliminate the possibility of such weapons being used, it is imperative also

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that we should now prohibit the development and production of these weapons as well as scrap stockpiles of them. Undoubtedly it will be much more difficult to discover an effective means of verification of compliance with a prohibition of their production than in the case of nuclear weapons. We must not, however, abandon the search for the solution to this question.

76. This year's Spring session of the Disarmament Committee focused attention in its debate on the question of the prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor is a preventive measure to check the arms race and, following the conclusion of the Treaty of Antarctica and of the Outer Space Treaty, it is extremely important for us to prevent the spread of the arms race to the sea-bed and ocean floor -- which occupies seventy per cent of the surface of the globe. Furthermore, in line with my country's approach that any realistic effort to achieve disarmament should start with the problems that can be most easily solved, we welcome the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted draft treaties on this subject (ENDC/249; 240).

77. Japan subscribes to the idea that the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof should be prohibited, in principle, for military purposes. We hope particularly that measures may be taken now in order to prevent the sea-bed being used as a military base for nuclear war. However, as Japan is surrounded by the sea, it is difficult for us to agree to the proposal that purely defensive devices against an attack from the sea should also be prohibited by the treaty. We hope that the treaty will be completed as soon as possible taking fully into account the security of every nation; and the Japanese delegation wishes to co-operate fully with the other delegations of this Committee to achieve this.

78. Today I have stated the fundamental positions of my Government on several problems in the field of disarmament. At later stages of our discussions I should like to present our views on some of these problems in detail and in specific form.

79. Permit me, in concluding my statement, to convey once again to all the members of the Committee the Japanese people's feeling of profound respect towards the noble efforts of this Committee, which is indeed holding high the torch of mankind's hope for lasting world peace and prosperity.

80. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia)(translation from Russian): First of all I wish to express on behalf of my delegation our gratitude to the representatives of the Soviet Union, Mexico and other countries for their warm congratulations and good wishes for the success of our work, as well as for the kind words addressed to our country.

81. Further, I wish to express to you, Mr. Chairman, and to all the members of the Committee our gratitude for allowing our delegation to speak for a second time at this meeting. In availing itself of this opportunity so kindly granted, our delegation would like to set forth briefly the position of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic on the main items on the agenda of our Committee.

82. As I have already stressed in my previous statement here, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic considers the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control to be the cardinal issue of the day, and it consistently supports any measures that may help towards stopping the arms race and averting the threat of a world thermonuclear war. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, to which I have already referred, emphasizes that the interests of the defence of universal peace and the safeguarding of international security call for the adoption of further effective measures in the field of disarmament and a patient search for ways of bringing closer together the various points of view, bearing in mind above all the fate of the peoples and the future of our planet. In this nuclear age the very existence of mankind is in question. Therefore it is necessary above all to seek steadfastly for ways and means that would lead in the first place to nuclear disarmament.

83. Our Government is naturally fully aware that the achievement of general and complete disarmament is a complex problem fraught with many difficulties, both objective and subjective. The main obstacle on this path is the interests of those influential forces in the West which are known as the military-industrial complex. It is precisely the international alliance of those monopolistic syndicates engaged in the production of weapons that defends with might and main the further stockpiling of means of mass destruction. In order to justify their dangerous activities those forces put forward the so-called concept of mutual deterrence or mutual terror, which no sound-minded man could accept in this nuclear age.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

84. The Mongolian delegation shares the deep concern expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, in his letter to our Committee of 15 February at the continuing arms race and plans for the development of new offensive and defensive weapon systems which are likely to bring about a new explosion in the race for nuclear and rocket weaponry. But now the risk of a thermonuclear catastrophe is so great that those who have taken upon themselves the enormous responsibility before the nations of working for disarmament have no right to surrender to difficulties. On the other hand, we believe that, notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties, the idea of the necessity of curbing and stopping the arms race is gradually gaining ground.

85. Thus our Committee is faced with a somewhat encouraging sign and a great number of serious problems calling for immediate solution. The one inspires us; the other compels us to exert still greater efforts towards the adoption of effective measures in the field of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. The Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament (ENDC/227) aptly covers those problems which deserve the most immediate attention.

86. The most important of the problems awaiting urgent solution is the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In conditions where the combined power of the nuclear weapons already stockpiled in the world is more than enough to annihilate the whole of mankind, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons meets the vital interests of all States and would be an important safeguard for the security of all nations. We consider that the Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI)), which declares in particular the use of such weapons to be a crime against humanity, should be given legal force. It behoves our Committee to exert the utmost efforts to elaborate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons on the basis of the existing draft submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/227).

87. The cessation of underground nuclear tests is another important question the solution of which would be a substantial step towards nuclear disarmament. In this question we base ourselves on the assumption that talk about the need for on-site inspection in order to carry out control over the implementation of the future treaty is motivated by

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political rather than technical considerations. We consider that for such control national seismological means of detection are adequate.

88. In speaking of measures contributing to the aim of achieving disarmament, we must not forget the urgent need to limit and reduce strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. We must always bear in mind that the growth of the threat of a world-wide nuclear catastrophe is directly proportionate to the degree of improvement of strategic means of delivery of nuclear warheads. This shows the extraordinary urgency of an immediate solution to the problem of limiting and subsequently eliminating such means of delivery.

89. Recently we have had reports of certain signs that the United States Government intends to begin in the near future talks on questions concerning the mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of offensive strategic weapon delivery systems and of defensive systems against ballistic missiles, in favour of which limitation and reduction the Soviet Union, as we know, has repeatedly expressed itself. Our delegation has noted with due attention that this intention of the United States Government is reaffirmed in the message of President Nixon which was read out at this meeting a short while ago by the representative of the United States. Our Government joins in the appeals for the immediate starting of such talks with the earnest intention of achieving positive results.

90. In our efforts directed towards nuclear disarmament, an exceptionally important place is given at the present time to ensuring the ratification of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/226*). The entry into force of that Treaty will be an important link in the system of measures leading to the outlawing of nuclear weapons.

91. The Mongolian People's Republic is in favour of an effective prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and of ensuring the strict observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Chemical and bacteriological weapons, for the production of which comparatively simple methods and inexpensive equipment and, consequently, a smaller outlay are required, are fraught with a great danger of unlimited proliferation. Moreover, the particularly inhuman and barbarous nature of chemical and bacteriological weapons consists in the fact that their sole target is living beings -- that is, mankind.

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For this reason only people who have lost all common sense oppose the prohibition of the use of such weapons. Our delegation hopes that it will be given an opportunity to set forth in greater detail the position of its Government on this urgent question when the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (A/7575) is discussed.

92. The Mongolian delegation considers it a timely and urgent measure to work out principles and rules to govern the activities of States in exploring and utilizing the sea-bed and the ocean floor. The placing of any military equipment on this vast area, covering five-sevenths of the surface of our planet, must be prohibited. We share the view that the achievement of an agreement to prevent the military use of this comparatively new sphere of human activity is fraught with less difficulties than the solution of some other problems connected with disarmament. The task is all the more facilitated by the fact that we have the draft treaty (ENDC/240) elaborated by the Soviet Union on prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes, which proposes a rational and generally-acceptable way of resolving this problem in the interests of all countries and peoples. We consider that our Committee should avail itself of these favourable opportunities as fully as possible. We hope that it will in fact make a real move towards achieving agreement on this urgent question.

93. Our delegation believes that the present session of the Committee on Disarmament will exert efforts to obtain the greatest possible concrete results for reporting to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, which in its resolution 2373 (XXII) (ENDC/226*) requested all States, including those represented on our Committee, urgently to seek effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament.

94. I have set forth very briefly the position of the Mongolian People's Republic on some of the main items on the agenda of our Committee. We shall expound it in greater detail in regard to some of these questions when the need arises.

95. Mr. FRAZAO (Brazil): On behalf of the Brazilian Government I should like to welcome the delegations of Japan and Mongolia who are joining this Conference today.

96. I particularly wish to express the sincere satisfaction with which my Government views Japan's admission to the Committee on Disarmament. Brazil has maintained for many years the most intimate and fruitful relations with Japan. The hundreds of thousands of Japanese immigrants into Brazil have, through their earnest work, contributed in a significant manner to the economic and social development of my country and are today fully integrated into our civilization. There are, furthermore, many instances of active Brazilian-Japanese co-operation in the economic and technical fields. This sentiment of recognition of the Japanese contribution to Brazilian prosperity is matched by a sentiment of admiration for what Japan has achieved: the unparalleled feat of breaking through the barriers of under-development and technological backwardness in less than a hundred years, thereby charting a new course for developing nations. A quarter of a century ago Japan underwent the tragedy of nuclear warfare, but has nevertheless fully recovered in one of the most remarkable performances of our times.

97. The uniqueness of those achievements places Japan in a paramount position to exercise an indisputable moral and political authority. By becoming a fully-fledged member of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan has gained an international forum where it can make its voice heard in the interests of world peace and disarmament. This voice will certainly be heeded, and it is clear that Japan's presence will add much significance to our deliberations. As a non-nuclear-weapon State that has attained a high level of technological development, Japan will undoubtedly provide the Committee on Disarmament with the benefit of relevant experience and a balanced judgement. Brazil trusts that Japan's contribution will bring us closer to fulfilling the terms of our mandate, thereby rewarding the great expectations of mankind as a whole from this Conference.

98. I am also confident that the People's Republic of Mongolia will give us very useful co-operation in the attainment of our objectives.

99. I do not want to mingle these words of joy and confidence with any criticisms; but it is no secret that my delegation holds strong views on the procedure that should be followed for the enlargement of the membership of this Committee. I shall later in the course of our current session devote a specific statement to this question.

(Mr. Frazão, Brazil)

100. Before I conclude these remarks, allow me to express the warm welcome of my delegation to the representative of the United States of America, Mr. James Leonard, to whom I extend my best wishes for the success of his mission.

101. The CHAIRMAN (India): I shall now read a statement prepared by the co-Chairmen with regard to the procedure of our work during this resumed session.

"The co-Chairmen are of the view that the Committee should follow the same procedures as at the last session. Formal plenary meetings would normally be held at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. Recalling their statements of 6 August 1968[8/] and 22 April 1969[9/], additional formal meetings may be arranged on Wednesdays if members desire to speak on that day; if any delegation wishes to call an informal Wednesday meeting, the co-Chairmen should be notified a reasonable time in advance."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 416th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M.A. Husain, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the Chairman and by the representatives of Japan and Mongolia.

"After conclusion of the open part of the meeting, statements were made by the representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mexico, Japan, Mongolia and Brazil.

"The representative of the United States of America conveyed to the Conference a message from the President of the United States (ENDC/253).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 8 July 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

8/ ENDC/PV.387, para.42

9/ ENDC/PV.405, para.108